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Russia has increasingly relied on its merchant fleet to discreetly transport weapons and military equipment to countries where it maintains strategic and economic interests.  These unofficial maritime supply routes are frequently used to support allied regimes or conflict zones in Africa and the Middle East, often circumventing international oversight and sanctions. Civilian vessels—flagged under Russia or using flags of convenience—carry cargo destined for both state military forces and Kremlin-linked paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group and the newer Africa Corps. This hybrid logistical model, blending commercial maritime operations with covert military supply chains, has become a critical component of Russia’s foreign strategy, enabling sustained influence and operational presence in key geopolitical theaters. Currently, several Russian-flagged merchant vessels are operating in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, en route to ports suspected of receiving military cargo.  These maritime movements suggest an ongoing logistical effort to supply matériel to partner states and Russian-aligned entities abroad. The presence of these ships in strategic sea lanes underscores the role of commercial shipping in sustaining Russia’s global military footprint, especially in regions like North Africa and the Middle East where direct military engagement is paired with covert supply operations. Current Situation At present, three Russian roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) and cargo vessels— MV Baltic Leader , Patria , and Siyanie Severa —have departed from the port of Baltiysk  in the Kaliningrad Region and have transited the English Channel , heading south. These vessels are being escorted by the Russian Navy’s Steregushchy-class corvette SKR-532 Boikiy , indicating the strategic importance of the convoy. While their exact destination remains unconfirmed, the current geopolitical context—particularly the ongoing situation in Syria—suggests that they may be bound for African or North African ports  in the Mediterranean Sea , potentially to deliver military equipment or logistical support. However , it appears that the MV Baltic Leader  may have diverged from the main group, taking an alternate route. This deviation could indicate either a separate logistical objective ( @RFNOSBlog ). Syria Outlook:  As of the latest satellite imagery dated 2 May 2025 , the port of Tartus , Russia’s key naval logistics hub in Syria, shows only containerized cargo on the quayside , with no visible military vehicles or equipment  present. This suggests that there is little to no matériel currently awaiting extraction. The most recent delivery , likely conducted by the MV Sparta IV  during a brief one-day stop on 26 April ( @kattyfun1 ) - ( @TiaFarris10 ) , appears to have been minimal, indicating either a temporary pause in operations or a reduced logistical footprint at this location. Post-Tartus Dynamics:  The operational status of Russian merchant vessels previously engaged in the so-called "Syrian Express"  has significantly changed in recent months—particularly following December 2024 , when Russia effectively lost access to the port of Tartus  due to the collapse of the Assad regime . This event marked a turning point in Russia’s eastern Mediterranean logistics, disrupting a long-standing maritime supply route for military support to Syria. Since then, the frequency and consistency of cargo ship transits to the Levant have declined sharply, with merchant vessels now rerouted or reassigned  to other theaters, particularly North Africa  and the Sahel region , where Russian private military contractors and strategic interests remain active. 29 april 2025 - Ro Ro Ascalon (9198226) Indicative Movements:  Further confirming this potential reorientation of Russian merchant vessel operations , on 29 April , the Russian Ro-Ro cargo ship Ascalon  was observed transiting the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound ( @PeterFerrary ) . Initially believed to be en route to Tartus —as part of its prior role in the Syrian Express —for the recovery of remaining Russian military assets, its subsequent position north of Port Said  suggests a different operational intent. The vessel now appears to be awaiting transit through the Suez Canal , indicating a likely shift toward ports in the Red Sea, East Africa, or the broader Indian Ocean region  where Russia is either receiving or delivering military-related cargo. This movement aligns with a broader trend of redistributing maritime military logistics away from the Levant. 20 april 2025 - Ro Ro MAIA-1 (IMO 9358010) Comparable Case:  A similar situation occurred a few days earlier, on 20 April , when the Russian cargo ship Maia 1  was observed transiting the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound . ( @PeterFerrary ) The vessel remained stationary for several days, likely in anchorage or awaiting clearance, before subsequently transiting the Suez Canal . This pattern reinforces the emerging shift in Russian maritime logistics, with vessels previously associated with the Syrian corridor now potentially being redirected toward alternative strategic theaters —notably in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, or the Indian Ocean —in line with evolving Russian military and geopolitical objectives. In both cases , it is presumed that the cargo vessels may have conducted refuelling operations from oil tankers  typically stationed in the holding area north of Port Said . If confirmed, this would illustrate a logistical modus operandi —not entirely new, but increasingly relevant—being adopted by Russia for merchant ships operating far from domestic ports , ensuring extended range and autonomy for military-support missions beyond its immediate naval infrastructure. Regarding the Ro-Ro MAIA 1 , significant research conducted by " @osc_london " suggests the vessel is involved in the transport of military material for Russia, as detailed in this report ( @osc_london ). The ship is currently in the Red Sea, heading south. Notably, on May 9 and 10, it followed unusual routes near Jeddah and Port Sudan—deviations that are atypical for standard commercial transit in the area. As of now, there is no OSINT evidence indicating interactions or activity involving other merchant vessels, though the irregular routing raises questions about the true purpose of the voyage and the nature of its cargo. Conclusion: The recent movements of Russian Ro-Ro and cargo vessels, particularly in the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal, reflect a noticeable adaptation of Russia’s maritime military logistics  in response to shifting geopolitical realities—most notably the loss of Tartus  and the collapse of the Assad regime. The observed patterns, including shorter port calls , escort by naval assets , and possible offshore refuelling , suggest a more flexible, decentralized, and long-range logistical model . While not entirely unprecedented, this evolution indicates that Russia is actively seeking to maintain strategic reach  and support for its military and proxy operations—particularly in Africa and the Middle East —through the increased use of civilian maritime assets  operating beyond traditional bases. This shift warrants continued monitoring, as it represents both a resilience mechanism  and a grey-zone strategy  aimed at sustaining influence under growing international constraints.

Current situation We have reached the fifth group of Vessels (Cargo - Tanker) sent to Syria by Russia for the recovery of military equipment in the former Russian Naval Base in TARTUS. The group definitely outside the Syrian port is still composed of the Russian Cargo Vessel SPARTA IV and the Oil Tanker GENERAL SKOBELEV while a few nautical miles outside the port is the frigate Admiral GRIGOROVICH , which escorted them there. The corvette SOOBRAZITELNIY , the VIKTOR LEONOV and the oil tanker VYAZMA are still not locate d. ( @TiaFarris10 ) Observations Compared to the previous transfers, where the Syrian authorities put up a lot of resistance to entering the port, in this last transfer, it was much easier. In fact, the Cargo SPARTA IV, strangely entered after a day but...... its stay was only one day. Could this be some kind of agreement to bring supplies to the Syrians? History of reports Cargo vessel SPARTA IV and Oil tanker General Skobelev northbound under the Great Belt Bridge in Denmark - Apr. 9, 2025. Cargo vessel SPARTA IV Oil tanker General Skobelev Russian cargo vessel Sparta IV is followed by Spanish Navy patrol vessel Isla de Leon (P83) and Royal Navy ship HMS Dagger (P296), eastbound in the Strait of Gibraltar - April 17, 2025 ( @ jr_amon_ceuta ) Russian cargo vessel Sparta IV Spotted on 4 May 2025, Admiral Grigorovich hanging around the port of TARTUS looks to be stopped ~17 km NW of the former naval piers. ( @MT_Anderson ) Details of the activity in the port of TARTUS The SPARTA IV docked just outside the port of TARTUS on the morning of April 26, but had already left the port by the evening of April 27. As reported in the post by: @kattyfun1 There are no updates on the location since April 28th. Situation in Syria There are no official or confirmed reports of significant clashes near the port of Tartus, Syria, on April 28, 2025. However, it is important to note that the situation in Syria is very complex and information can be partial or contradictory, especially in active conflict zones such as those around TARTUS and LATAKIA. The port of TARTUS, which hosts a Russian naval base, has been a strategic target in military operations, and there are occasional airstrikes or other military actions in the area. There have also been reports of airstrikes by Israelis or other actors involved in the Syrian conflict, aimed at destroying weapons or facilities linked to groups backed by Iran. Comments There is no news or updates regarding the position of the Oil Tanker GENERAL SKOBELEV ( Last position: April 25, South Cyprus heading to TARTUS ) There is no news or updates regarding the position of the MV SPARTA IV. The Ro Ro Cargo ASCALON , currently south of Crete, seems to be proceeding towards Port Said. Most likely it is headed to other ports where Russia transfers or acquires material of interest. Track of the MV ASCALON Cargo ships MV BALTIC LEADER and PATRIA , as well as the dry cargo ship SIYANIE SEVERA left the port of Baltiysk (Kaliningrad Region) in the direction of the Mediterranean Sea together with the corvette "Boykiy" of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy. Given the short time spent in the port of Tartus, it is unclear whether the SPARTA IV : should return to the port of TARTUS again waiting for the other vessels, currently in transit in the English Channel. This would entail additional waiting time.

The Ro Ro Cargo “PATRIA” left Baltiysk, Russia, on 30.04.2025 for an unknown destination. The merchant ship is sailing together with the MV Siyane Severa and both are escorted by the Russian corvette Boikiy 532, Stereghchiy class. Given the way in which the transit is taking place, under escort, it is assumed that the merchant ships are heading towards Syria to recover the remaining Russian military material present in the Naval Base of TARTUS (ex. Syrian Express). The vessel PATRIA, in the last year, has been used in the Baltic area, where it shuttled between the ports of Baltiysk - Kaliningrad - Sankt-Peterburg - Lomonosov – Kronshtadt almost certainly for the transport of military equipment. In February 2024 it would have made a stop in the port of Vladivostok on 2024-01-25 and then Singapore (2024-02-16) always remaining in the Asian area (map below). Therefore it does not appear to have been used in Syria .... so far. Visited ports Busan (Republic of Korea), Kaliningrad (russia), Korsakov (russia), Nakhodka (russia), Nantong (PRC), Pevek (russia), Qingdao Gang (PRC), Sankt-Peterburg (russia), Taicang (PRC), Ulsan (Republic of Korea), Vladivostok (russia), Vostochnyy (russia), Svetly (russia), Kronstadt (russia), Egvekinot (russia), Bronka (russia), Anadyr (russia), Wei Hai Harbour (PRC), Mys Pospelova (russia) Vessel information The vessel is affiliated with the sanctioned russian company PJSC Sakhalin shipping company, one of the largest russian shipping companies in the Far East, which is among the top 100 largest container shipping companies in the world, is one of the leaders in terms of cabotage traffic and an important link in export and import traffic with the Asia-Pacific region. It is part of the Delo Group of companies (affiliated with Rosatom State Corporation), with 58.67% of its shares owned by the sanctioned PJSC TransContainer, russia's largest railway container operator providing a full range of transport and logistics services in integration with other Delo Group assets. The vessels of PJSC Sakhalin shipping company are involved in the development of future large-scale russian energy facilities, the delivery of relevant construction materials and equipment by sea to the Taimyr Peninsula, and the expansion of russia's trade routes to new foreign jurisdictions to replace the economic ties lost after russia's invasion of Ukraine. In July 2023, USA imposed sanctions on 14 vessels, including the "Patria". (Source: https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/transport/ships/193 ) Current position Summary Cargo / Container ship Callsign: UBVP6 Gross Tonage: 5825 DWT: 5795 Builder: Pendik Shipyard Owner: Sakhalin Shipping Co (SASCO) TEU: 619 Length: 101 Width: 19 Year Build: 1999 Country: Russian Federation Last seen: May 2, 16:30 Status: under way using engine Load information - Information taken from open sources not to be considered 100% reliable From the graph it is clear that on April 17 it loaded containers (draught (m) from 6.2 to 7). On the day of departure it returned to the draught of 6.2 meters so during the stop it unloaded some material. Doing a quick calculation, with the help of ChatGPT: - the weight loss of about 660 tons corresponds approximately to: 33 x 20-foot containers (TEU) 25 x 40-foot containers (FEU) The moment a stop is made, we will see the difference. Conclusions, the MV PATRIA is most likely heading towards Syria, but given the previous port calls, it could continue towards other countries where Russia is transferring military equipment (Wagner or Africa Corps) or receives them as from North Korea.

Since December 2024, the RFN no longer has a naval base in the Mediterranean Sea. Despite this particular situation, the RFN decides to send ships and submarines in the Mediterranean. The naval presence allows to maintain open economic and logistic relations with the partner countries of Russia which are bordering on the Mediterranean. It also allows control of traffic to and from the Black Sea by Russian vessels. At this time of transition, the RFN benefits from the support of some countries such as Egypt and Algeria. In the future, we may see some ships also in Libya where on several occasions they have made diplomatic visits. From February there are new entries in the Mediterranean... a Kilo class submarine accompanied by a support ship ( Krasnodar and Evgenit Churv ) The two warships made a direct voyage to the Syrian coast. During this stretch, they made a probable stop in an area north-east of Libya (Tobruk) and another one north of Egypt (Alexandria). TUG and SUB Movements from February 12th to March 4th 2025 What happened in the previous months? In December 2024 Krasnodar  (B-265), Russian Improved ‘Kilo’-class (Project 636.3), demonstrated its operational readiness after a period in the shipyard in Kronstadt. The Russian Ministry of Defence reported on 23 December 2024 that the submarine had completed a torpedo-firing serial in the Baltic Sea, operating with support from Kaliningrad. On 3 February 2025 the submarine Krasnodar  moved through the Great Belt towards the Skagerrak strait above Denmark together with the Sliva-class deep sea tug Evgeniy Churov  (SB-921).  The duo has now passed through the English Channel and, according to open sources, was outside Portuguese territorial waters to the west of the Iberian Peninsula on the morning of 11 February. Strait passage of Gibraltar - Tug Evgenit Churv & Submarine Krasnodar Post X: Feb 12, 2025 at 19:20 hrs (by @PeterFerrary ) What happened after 12 February? On 15 February, the submarine Krasnodar was sighted north of Algeria, western Mediterranean Sea along with the tugboat Evgeniy Churov . On 17 February, the Russian submarine Krasnodar passed off the southern coast of Sicily as it continued its eastward journey. Once again, multiple NATO assets took turns monitoring its movements. ( https://www.itamilradar.com/2025/02/17/eyes-still-on-the-russian-submarine/ ) Multiple NATO assets took turns monitoring Krasnodar On 24 February, they were brought back to a position north Marsa Matruh, Egypt. Below some IR images of the two boats. Tug Evgeniy Churov (SB-921) Submarine Krasnodar B-265 The Spanish Navy has identified the submarine Krasnodar in the eastern Mediterranean. The Spaniards did not report many details about its location and type of activity. Images showing the two boats standing still were published. Most likely they were engaged in logistic support operations. The submarine was later sighted while travelling with the tugboat to the port of Alexandria, Egypt. Source ( https://maritime-executive.com/article/spanish-navy-monitors-transit-of-russian-attack-submarine ) Russian attack submarine and a Russian tug (by Spanish Navy) Port stops for logistics and handling activities Alternatively, Algeria could provide assistance and logistical support to the RFN. The Algerian navy operates a base for its 'Kilo' submarines in Mers El-Kébir. Since these belong to the same series of Krasnodar - 'Kilo' submarines modified by project 636.3 - there could be synergies in terms of supply and maintenance. Tobruk could be a possible Russian base in Libya. Russia has supported Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of the Libyan National Army, by providing weapons and training assistance. Moreover, Libya could be a gateway to support various Russian private Military companies in Africa. There has also been speculation about a possible Russian naval base in the Red Sea at Port Sudan. Source ( https://euro-sd.com/2025/02/major-news/42534/a-russian-sub-back-to-the-med/ ) Conclusions In the next article we will analyse the movements and the probable areas of activity and patrolling --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Document produced with the aid of an open source used with posts by X by: @ItaMilRadar @Romanovichphoto @te3ej @PeterFerrary )

Viktor Leonov CCB-175, Vishnya-class Since April 14, 2025, the Russian Navy's Vishnya-class AGI Viktor Leonov (CCB 175) has entered the Mediterranean ( @key2med ). - From April 16 to 19, 2025 , it made a stopover in the port of Algiers. - From April 19 , it continued its navigation along the Spanish coast, before sailing on along the French coast ( @TiaFarris10 ). Viktor Leonov navigation along the Spanish coast The previous visit to the Mediterranean dates back to November 2024. During that period, it made a technical stopover in the port of Algiers, where it refueled before continuing its mission in the Eastern Mediterranean. As happened in 2024, from April 16 to 19, 2025, the ship stopped in Algiers and also on that occasion it refueled , in addition to the usual protocol visits ( @RFNOSBlog ). In recent years and especially after the loss of the Tartus Naval Base, every time the RFN ships stop in Algeria, they show, through posts on X, the ritual photo with the Algerian military authorities. In a reduced form, it also happens when they go to Egypt. The question I ask myself is: Why does the RFN send a Vishnya class, with high SIGINT capabilities, instead of the Moma class, at this particular time without a naval base? Is the deployment of the Victor Leonov (Vishnya class) just a rotation? Is RFN planning something bigger? Let’s analyze and evaluate the different hypotheses that could have led the RFN to employ a vessel of this caliber. The Victor Leonov is a Russian intelligence vessel that frequently operates in international waters and has been sighted in several regions over the years, including the Mediterranean Sea. The Victor Leonov is equipped with sophisticated signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, designed to intercept and analyze communications, radar signals and other electronic emissions. Let’s look in detail at its acoustic characteristics that have been of most interest to Russia in recent years. Key ACINT Capabilities of the Victor Leonov Underwater Sound Detection : The Victor Leonov  is equipped with highly sensitive hydrophones and sonar systems designed to pick up acoustic emissions from submarines and other naval vessels. This allows the ship to track the movement of submarines, including nuclear-powered and conventional ones, in both deep and shallow waters. - Surveillance of Critical Infrastructure : The ship is often observed near undersea communication cables, raising concerns about potential sabotage or intelligence collection on data networks. Integration with Other Intelligence Platforms : ACINT data gathered by the Victor Leonov  can be integrated with other forms of intelligence, including signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). This multi-source data fusion allows Russia to get a more complete picture of naval activities, improving their situational awareness and intelligence collection capabilities. Geopolitical and Military Intelligence : By operating in areas like the Mediterranean Sea, where NATO forces often conduct exercises and deploy fleets, the Victor Leonov  can intercept a variety of maritime communications, detect naval movements, and gather detailed information about Western military activities. This is useful for both tactical purposes (e.g., identifying weaknesses in NATO’s naval posture) and strategic purposes (e.g., understanding the larger patterns of Western military deployment and readiness). Essentially, the Victor Leonov's ACINT capability isn't limited to its sensors; the ship can also work in coordination with Russian submarines or other assets to track acoustic signatures in more remote or contested areas, such as the deep waters of the Mediterranean . Note: Given the ship’s importance to Russian naval intelligence, it is not uncommon for the Victor Leonov to be closely monitored by NATO countries as well, as it poses a potential security risk if it is seen as attempting to intercept sensitive naval operations or collect critical data on NATO submarine forces. Factors to consider In recent months, the Russian vessel AGOR Yantar has been carrying out monitoring activities in the Mediterranean Sea. During its stay, it has carried out several monitoring operations in areas close to submarine cables. Given the particular capabilities of the Victor Leonov, is it possible that the use of this vessel is a co-executive or complementary activity to that of the Yantar? If so, we should note the activity of the Victor Leonov as similar to that of the Yantar. Russian Navy ship YANTAR The photo below shows an article by ItaMilRadar , which indicates the areas of probable monitoring of the Yantar in the month of December 2024. In relation to what has been said, these could be the areas of next patrolling of the Victor Leonov. The Yantar may have left behind underwater sensors that the Victor Leonov could exploit, information not confirmed by any source but possible. Russian Navy ship YANTAR - probable monitoring areas December 2024 Post : While we have no official confirmation, we hypothesize that these missions may be linked to the presence of the Russian Navy vessel Yantar in the western Mediterranean. The Yantar is specialized in deep-sea maritime inspections and is known to be used by Moscow for monitoring undersea cables (and, let’s face it, the line between “monitoring” and “sabotage” can be thin) and shehas conducted similar missions in the stretch of sea between the United Kingdom and Ireland. Below is a map of the submarine cables where Victor Leonov could be present in the coming months. Submarine Cable Map Factors to consider Another element to consider is the possible absence of the Krasnodar Kilo-class submarines. The submarine has been in port in Algiers since April 20, 2025 and we do not know whether it will leave the Mediterranean or not. Krasnodar submarine and the EUGENY TCHUROV rescue tug, stopped at the port of Algiers on, April 20, 2025. What we do know, however, is that the lack of a permanent base makes Russian operations in the Mediterranean much more complicated and much less effective. Could the use of the Victor Leonov in the Mediterranean fill this lack of an underwater component in the Mediterranean Sea? Technical features to consider of the Victor Leonov Given the unavailability of a naval base like Tartus, Leonov has an endurance of about 45 days (7000 nautical miles - 16 knots), which means that it does not require many stops. However, as with previous ships, Victor Leonov could call at Alexandria, Egypt. Known Periods of Activity in the Mediterranean:   2018 :    - According to reports from Russian media (e.g., Sputnik Italia), ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, including intelligence vessels like the Viktor Leonov, were active in the Mediterranean as part of Russia’s permanent naval task force in the region. 2021 :    - The Viktor Leonov was again reported in the Mediterranean, particularly near the Syrian coast and in proximity to NATO naval assets. It was tracked by NATO forces, including Italian and French navies, as it conducted operations close to undersea communication cables and strategic areas. 2023–2024 :    - The ship was intermittently reported in the Mediterranean, often transiting through the Strait of Gibraltar and operating in international waters near NATO countries like Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. Its activities included monitoring NATO naval exercises and gathering intelligence on military infrastructure. In conclusion , the RFN continues to be present in the Mediterranean trying in every way to demonstrate that it has control of the Mediterranean area, despite the loss of the Naval Base in Syria, and maintain an excellent relationship with partner countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Libya (a country recently coveted by the USA).

Spectacular SAT image of Algiers. It looks like they have placed an anti-intrusion barrier. If so, it would be the first time that a naval asset of the RFN in port has feared being attacked. This is the first time a RFN submarine has been in a foreign port since the loss of the Naval Base in TARTUS, Syria. At the moment it is not confirmed that it is an anti-intrusion barrier, in fact it could also be an anti-pollution barrier . If so, we can say that the submarine has refueled. I do not have the expertise to say if a refueling in a commercial port is possible for a submarine, but as is known, the Algerians have the ability to manage kilo-class submarines as they also have them. We will look into this in other posts to understand what that barrier is. The barrier is shown in the red dotted box, while the anchor point of the barrier to the pier is highlighted in yellow. The Krasnodar submarine and the Eugeny Tchurov rescue tug, stopped at the port of Algiers from 20 to 24 April so the images analyzed confirm those already inserted in the previous posts . Krasnodar submarine and the EUGENY TCHUROV rescue tug, stopped at the port of Algiers on, April 20, 2025. These are some anti-intrusion barriers used in the port of Algiers. These are anti-intrusion barriers used in the port of Sevastopol Conclusions, we can not confirm anything for the moment if we had a confirmation with other images we could say if intrusion or pollution. I hope someone can add more info on this.

The frigate Grigorovich did not pass by the STROG as did the vessel ASCALON (IMO:9198226 - Last contact 12 MAR near Malta - by @TiaFarris10 ) , they could still be in the MED. The weather conditions are favorable and considering the distance they could be in transit at this time. By @TiaFarris10 Dangerous manoeuvre in the sea by the Russian cargo ship   ASCALON  near a collision with a foreign cargo ship . Exclusive photos of the cargo ship   ASCALON  near Malta prove that the Syrian Express convoy did indeed split in two (photos taken on 10th March 2025). Category Transportation of military cargo Weapons and military equipment Vessel information Involved in the transportation of weapons for the Russian Federation, it is considered one of the participants in the so-called "Syrian Express" (a supply route to Syria from Russian ports on the Black Sea (Novorossiysk) through the Bosphorus Strait). The vessel has been repeatedly captured on satellite images at the Novorossiysk naval base.In 2018, it delivered missiles for the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia to the PRC.The owner of the vessel is the sanctioned Russian maritime shipping company LLC "M Leasing"(TIN9701173086).In May 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on the vessels of LLC "M Leasing" (including "Ascalon") involved in the transportation of weapons. Ports visited Al Iskandariyh (Alexandria) (Egypt), Conakry (Guinea), Gelendzhgic (Russian Federation), Novorossiysk (Russian Federation), Oran (Algeria), Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo), Sankt-Peterburg (Russian Federation), Zeytinburnu (Turkey), Kronstadt (Russian Federation), Algeria (Algeria), Tin Can Island (Nigeria), Sheskharis (Russian Federation), Khalifa (UAE) Shipowner (IMO / country / date) LLC "M Leasing" (6246853 / rf / 02.09.2021) https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-QRwDBWGMrmDwjbQzjFdYFh/ M Leasing LLC  is a Russian shipping company providing logistical support to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In particular, M Leasing LLC is involved in a military transportation network of Russian cargo vessels shipping North Korean armaments from Pyongyang to military facilities in the Russian port of Dunai. Subsequently, North Korean munitions transported by M Leasing LLC are transferred to a munitions depot in the town of Tikhoretsk on Russia’s western border to be deployed in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, M Leasing LLC is supporting materially the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Ship: Angara (IMO 9179842) Adler (IMO 9179854) Ascalon (IMO 9198226)

The Syrian Express is the name used to describe the regular supply voyages through the Bosporus to Syria, in particular using amphibious warfare ships of the Russian Navy, that were made during the Syrian civil war (2011–2024). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the Turkish authorities were persuaded to implement terms of the Montreux convention, banning the passage of further military vessels through the Bosporus.( wikipedia.org ) In March 2024, Ukrainian naval drones forced the Russian Federation to halt arms shipments by sea from Novorossiysk to Syria due to the increasing threat these drones posed. This rerouting extended the delivery distance for arms shipments from 2,500 kilometers to 9,000 kilometers—an increase of 3.6 times. ( defence-ua.com ) Red line old route - Yellow line new route With the fall of the Syrian regime the change in nature of the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war will lead to a further change in the nature of the traffic using this route. ( wikipedia.org ) Transfers from Syria to Batico and vice versa The transfer from Syria to the Baltic takes place in convoys with the escort of the RFN Ships. The escort is carried out in two distinct areas: - Mediterranean Sea - English Channel to the Baltic Sea The vessels are not escorted in the Atlantic Ocean along the Portuguese and French coasts. RFN Ships Escort Area RFN ships employed The RFN ships that carry out the escort are: - Mediterranean Sea : Frigates or destroyer deployed in MED/Syria: Admiral Gorshkov class Admiral Grigorovich class - England Channel/Baltic Area : Frigates, corvette or destroyer present in the Baltic Sea: Udaloy class Steregushchiy class "In any case, warships with defense capabilities were used despite the fact that military landing ships with their own defenses were present in the convoys." Military personnel on board the vessels During the transfer, in addition to the fleet of vessels, probable military personnel were also present on board. Visible on board the Vessel Baltic Leader personnel in camouflage gear, most likely employed for Force Protection. Cargo ship Baltic Leader - 4 mar 2025  Cargo ship Baltic Leader - 4 mar 2025  During the crossing of the English Channel, a particular attitude of the Russian warship was also observed, which is usually used when crossing straits or decidedly dangerous areas... something that I think does not happen in the English Channel. "Dramatic pictures taken by The Times from a fishing vessel show armed officers and crew maDramatic pictures taken by The Times from a fishing vessel show armed officers and crew manning machine guns on the warship, as it passed through the south of the Channel.nning machine guns on the warship, as it passed through the south of the Channel." ( @globalbeaconn ) Russian corvette, Boikiy (532) 4 mar 2025   Mediterranean Sea Escort The escort takes place from the port of Tartus to the Strait of Gibraltar and vice versa for ships without cargo and with cargo on board. During the transit, a stop is made near Malta where the ships refuel. (Ship to Ship) Transit in the Mediterranean Sea - Replenishment areas English Channel to the Baltic Sea The escort begins at the entrance to the English Channel and continues until arriving in the Baltic. Post (by @ItaMilRadar ) The Russian ships are resupplying west of Oran from the tanker Yelnya, which has been waiting there for almost two months. Resupplying west of Oran from the tanker Yelnya Red Line: RFN Units - Yellow Line: Vessel Conclusions The ships of the Syrian Express have changed their route since March 2024. Since December 2025, they have been carrying out a transfer of military equipment following the crisis in Syria. The RFN adapts on every occasion, protects its material and its ships. "Now it is not a Syria Express but an EX Syrian Express ."