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The waters of the Eastern Mediterranean have long been a stage for military maneuvers, and a recent maritime intelligence analysis has focused on an unusual but significant duo: the Tug 119  and the Russian diesel-electric Kilo II-class submarine, the Novorossisk . Although the submarine's precise location is unknown, it is presumed to be operating within the support radius of the Tug 119, which acts as a "silent shadow," providing essential logistical support. Following the loss of full access to the Tartus naval base in Syria, Russian naval forces have been compelled to seek new support options. In this context, Egypt has taken on a crucial role, offering its ports as a staging point. It's within this scenario that the recent activities of the Tug 119 are particularly noteworthy. A Highly Probable Port Call in Alexandria It's highly probable, though not officially confirmed, that the Tug 119 made a port visit to Alexandria. The certainty lies in the fact that the vessel ceased transmitting its position data during a specific timeframe. This radio silence is a telltale sign of a probable port call, with Alexandria  being the most logical location, given the tug's previously and subsequently recorded positions. This operational pattern suggests a strategic necessity for resupply and maintenance, an important window for the Novorossisk and its support vessel. Tug 119 Activity Log from July 15 Continuous monitoring of the Tug 119's activities has allowed us to outline a possible timeline of events and operations: July 15 - 20:  The Tug 119 arrives in the Alexandria area, likely to prepare for the submarine's arrival and establish a secure operational zone. During this period, the vessel may have conducted reconnaissance or waited for the submarine in a designated area. July 22 - 27:  As indicated by the cessation of its public tracking, the Tug 119 was likely moored in the port of Alexandria, coinciding with the Novorossisk's stop. This stay enabled critical operations such as refueling, resupply, and potential technical checks or repairs. July 28 - August 7:  After leaving the Egyptian port, the Tug 119 moved to an unspecified operational area in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its current position is not public, but it's believed to be continuing its role as a logistical shield for the Novorossisk, providing long-range support and ensuring the continuity of its missions in a strategic area. In conclusion, the ongoing patrols of the Tug 119 are not just routine navigation but a clear indication of Russian submarine presence and activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its consistent presence is the visible signal of a naval strategy that leverages flexibility and logistical support to maintain a projection of force, even without a permanent naval base in the region. The future activities of this support vessel will be crucial for anticipating the next moves of the Novorossisk and, more broadly, the Russian fleet in an area of global strategic importance.

A Russian military convoy is currently underway in the Mediterranean exit zone, west of Tenes, Algeria, involving: 🔹 SPARTA  (Russian-flagged merchant vessel) 🔹 GENERAL SKOBELEV  (Russian-flagged tanker/oil vessel) 🔹 DADNA BASE / BOIKY 532  (Steregushchiy-class corvette, Russian Navy) According to AIS tracking data, the Steregushchiy-class corvette Boiky  (hull number 532)  is actively escorting the merchant vessel SPARTA  and the tanker GENERAL SKOBELEV  as the group transits westward at a speed of ~11 knots on heading 260°. The last port call for SPARTA includes a confirmed stop in Tartus, Syria , where it conducted loading/unloading operations—presumably related to military equipment or logistics. The presence of a surface combatant escort  for civilian vessels is a clear indicator of sensitive or high-value cargo , potentially including military hardware or dual-use equipment , underscoring the strategic importance of this convoy to the Russian Federation. 🛰️ The escort operation highlights the ongoing Russian military logistics activity in the Mediterranean , with Tartus remaining a critical naval logistics hub. The direct involvement of Boiky 532  points to the convoy’s elevated operational security requirements. 📍 Current Position: North of Tenes, Algeria ⛴️ Last departure: Gulei, China (SPARTA - Aug 3, 19:40 UTC) 🛑 Destination: Unreported / Not available via AIS ⚠️ During a previous return from the Mediterranean, a shadow fleet vessel  joined the convoy mid-transit. Merchant traffic in the area should be closely monitored — a similar insertion of an untracked or sanctioned vessel could occur again. #MaritimeSecurity #OSINT Assessment: This movement fits the profile of ongoing Russian efforts to maintain and protect military supply chains between domestic production centers and forward bases (i.e., Tartus). The active escort by a navy warship signals cargo of strategic relevance , possibly linked to Syria-based operations or restocking post-deployment assets.

The Russian-flagged general cargo vessel MV Lauga  (IMO 9111060), constructed in 1994, has recently conducted port calls in West African locations such as Conakry (Guinea), Bissau (Guinea-Bissau), and Cotonou (Benin). These ports have been associated with activities involving Russian private military companies (PMCs) and the transport of military equipment. While there is no direct evidence linking MV Lauga to Russian governmental or Ministry of Defence entities, the vessel's operational patterns suggest potential strategic military implications. Vessel Profile and Operational History Name:  MV Lauga IMO Number:  9111060 Flag:  Russian Federation Type:  General Cargo Ship Deadweight Tonnage:  3,186 tonnes Length Overall:  102.3 meters Beam:  16.4 meters Year Built:  1994 Notably, MV Lauga's operational routes have intersected with regions of strategic interest to Russian military operations and PMCs. Strategic Analysis of Port Calls Conakry (Guinea) Conakry has been a focal point for Russian PMCs operating in West Africa. The port's infrastructure and geopolitical positioning make it a strategic location for logistical support to military operations in the region. MV Lauga's call at Conakry on July 5, 2025, places it in proximity to these activities, raising questions about potential logistical support functions. Wikipedia Bissau (Guinea-Bissau) Bissau serves as a transit point for various maritime activities, some of which have been linked to the transport of military equipment. While there is no direct evidence of MV Lauga's involvement in such activities, its presence in the region warrants scrutiny, given the historical context of arms trafficking through West African ports. Cotonou (Benin) Cotonou is a significant port in West Africa, with a history of being used for the transshipment of goods, including military supplies. MV Lauga's operations in this area suggest a potential role in regional logistics networks, which may include support for military or paramilitary operations. Operational Patterns and Potential Military Implications MV Lauga's operational patterns exhibit characteristics often associated with military logistics support: Extended Port Stays:  Prolonged stays in ports such as Conakry and Bissau may indicate the loading or unloading of sensitive cargo, possibly related to military logistics. Routing Through Strategic Locations:  The vessel's routing through areas with known military activity suggests potential coordination with military or paramilitary entities. AIS Data Anomalies:  Instances of AIS data manipulation or gaps in reporting can be indicative of operations involving sensitive or covert activities. While these patterns do not constitute direct evidence of MV Lauga's involvement in military operations, they align with behaviors observed in vessels engaged in military logistics. Last Position Conclusion While there is no conclusive evidence linking MV Lauga directly to Russian governmental or Ministry of Defence entities, its operational patterns and port calls in West Africa suggest a potential role in supporting military or paramilitary activities in the region. Given the strategic importance of the ports visited and the historical context of Russian military involvement in West Africa, MV Lauga's operations warrant further monitoring and analysis to assess its potential contributions to regional military logistics networks.

Sketchy Boats - schedule ( 6/11 ) Tankers that are 15 years or older Age: 22 years United Kingdom sanctioned vessels: Ships involved in the transportation of Russian oil (sanctions: uk-2025-07-21) European Union sanctioned vessels: Seventeenth sanctions package (sanctions: eu-2025-05-21) Flags that this ship carried, that were determined to be false Aruba (fraud:false-flag) Vessel listed on the false Aruba Maritime Administration & Offshore Company Registry website Currently false flagged Current Position Current Status: The current position of WHITE CONDOR I is at North East Atlantic Ocean reported 1 min ago by AIS. The vessel is en route to SKAGEN OPL , sailing at a speed of 13.6 knots and expected to arrive there on Aug 7, 15:00 . The vessel WHITE CONDOR I (IMO 9255244, MMSI 307026000) is a Oil Products Tanker built in 2003 (22 years old) and currently sailing under the flag of Aruba . Comments: After spending two months loitering in the Mediterranean, false flagged WHITE CONDOR I (previously BOLOGNIA FALCON), sets sail for 'SKAGEN'. Sketchy Boats - Link: https://sketchy.boats/9255244 Ports Visited

Premise: Monitoring and Tracking Systems In the current operational environment, monitoring the Russian shadow fleet is a strategic priority for international maritime security. There's an intensifying reliance on specialized databases such as " sketchy.boats ,"  a dedicated platform that allows for the verification and inclusion of potentially suspicious vessels identified as part of the shadow fleet. This tool is a critical asset for naval intelligence , enabling the crowdsourcing of information and collaborative monitoring of suspect naval units. The importance of such databases cannot be overstated in the current geopolitical landscape. The ability to rapidly track and identify shadow fleet vessels through these systems significantly multiplies the force  for maritime intelligence operations. Our dedicated website will maintain an updated list and map  of monitored units, providing continuous support for naval intelligence analyses, drawing in expert intelligence analysts. Key Departure Ports and Primary Destinations Departure Hubs The primary departure hubs for shadow tankers are located in the Baltic (Ust-Luga and Primorsk terminals) and the Black Sea (Tuapse and Novorossiysk terminals). In the first half of 2024, these terminals accounted for 42% of Russian seaborne hydrocarbon exports. These vessels frequently operate under the flags of convenience from countries like Gabon , Liberia , and the Cook Islands , and regularly call at Russian oil ports including Primorsk , Ust-Luga , Vyssotsk , and St. Petersburg . Routes and Destinations Shadow fleet units primarily utilize three strategic corridors: Baltic Route:  From the Baltic to Asian destinations, transiting through the North Sea and circumnavigating the northern UK to bypass traditional chokepoints like the English Channel. Black Sea Route:  From Tuapse and Novorossiysk terminals towards the Mediterranean, with primary destinations in the Middle East and Asia. Arctic Route:  Utilizing ports such as Murmansk, operational for 7-8 months a year, en route to Asian destinations via the Northern Sea Route. Operational tactics employed include spoofed geolocation data , false routing, switched-off communications, and ship-to-ship transfers in international waters. New FSB Security Directives Vessels originating from foreign ports are now permitted to enter Russian ports only with the explicit authorization of the respective seaport captain, which must be coordinated with a Federal Security Service (FSB) official. This decree was signed by Vladimir Putin in response to new EU sanctions, mandating FSB approval for foreign vessel access to Russian ports. This directive, issued on July 21, 2025, is a precautionary measure aimed at preventing potential damage to Russian port infrastructure and shadow fleet units during loading operations. The imposition of mandatory FSB pre-authorization underscores Russia's escalating concern for the security of its illicit commercial naval operations.( @SONARROW_OSINT ) Recent Incidents and Attacks on Shadow Fleet Units Infrastructure Sabotage The most significant escalation in recent months involves the direct participation of the shadow fleet in sabotage operations against critical Western infrastructure. The tanker Eagle S , suspected of being part of Russia's "ghost fleet," is implicated in damaging the EstLink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia on December 25, 2024, reportedly using its anchor. Kinetic Attacks against Units Since January 2025, there has been an intensification of attacks against shadow fleet tankers. Six tankers have been struck by explosions of unknown origin, all occurring after the vessels had made calls at Russian ports. The latest incident involves the Eco Wizard , which experienced two detonations ten minutes apart on July 6 while berthed. This pattern of attacks suggests the existence of coordinated maritime counter-intelligence operations , designed to degrade the shadow fleet's operational capability through direct action. Protection and Escort of Units: The Estonia Case Russia has demonstrated a willingness to actively protect its shadow fleet units through direct intervention. The recent incident involving the tanker Green Admire , detained by Russian authorities while transiting a route previously agreed upon with Estonia and Finland, highlights the crucial and controversial role of Moscow's "shadow fleet." This episode underscores how Moscow is escalating its protective posture towards shadow fleet units, directly challenging international agreements to ensure the protection of its illicit commercial operations. For the first time, a Russian warship, the corvette Boyky , directly escorted two tankers of the "shadow fleet" through the English Channel, providing direct protection to these commercial units. A map of the Green Admire's  route in the Gulf of Finland on May 17 and 18. The tanker is currently anchored off Suursaar Island , also known as Gogland. Venemaa is the Estonian name for Russia. Source: Risto Paenurm/ERR Evasion Tactics and Alternative Routes Diversification of Arctic Routes To counter intensified controls on traditional routes, Russia has shifted some of its shadow fleet activities towards Arctic ports such as Murmansk. However, these represent a fallback solution, as they are only navigable for seven to eight months of the year. Northern UK Routes Shadow fleet units have developed navigation patterns aimed at evading controls by circumnavigating the northern UK, exploiting international waters to minimize exposure to Western maritime authority inspections. This tactic enables them to avoid traditional chokepoints like the English Channel, where joint NATO patrols increase the likelihood of interdiction and inspection. Institutional Response and Countermeasures NATO and the EU have initiated a monitoring mission following suspicious incidents attributed to the Russian "ghost fleet" and have introduced new sanctions. The intensification of countermeasures indicates recognition of the shadow fleet as a systemic threat to maritime security and Western economic stability. Intelligence Assessment The Russian shadow fleet currently serves as a multi-purpose instrument  for Moscow: economically, it circumvents oil sanctions; operationally, it provides sabotage capabilities  against critical infrastructure; strategically, it constitutes a power projection asset  in the maritime domain. The tactical evolution towards utilizing Arctic and northern routes, combined with active protection of units by Russian authorities, indicates a maturation of the operational concept . The series of kinetic attacks against tankers suggests the existence of coordinated counter-operations, likely conducted through proxies or Western special units. Continuous monitoring via specialized databases like sketchy.boats and collaborative intelligence remain the most effective tools for tracking and neutralizing this asymmetric threat  in the maritime domain.

As Russia adapts to its declining presence in Syria, the logistical footprint of its maritime operations is evolving — and the case of the LADY D  exemplifies this transformation. Currently stationary just north of Port Said, the sanctioned Russian-flagged merchant vessel, which departed the Baltic in late May 2025, presents a key indicator of how Moscow is reconfiguring its military and strategic supply chains across the broader Indo-Pacific axis. Strategic Maritime Reach: Russia’s Indo-Pacific Logistics and Bilateral Access Points As Russia recalibrates its maritime logistics following the diminishing viability of Tartus as a strategic hub, it is increasingly reliant on bilateral partnerships across the Indo-Pacific and South Asia to project operational endurance and maintain military-industrial outreach. These destinations serve both overt commercial and latent military functions, particularly in the context of circumventing Western sanctions and sustaining long-range deployments of sanctioned or dual-use cargo vessels. Activity registered August 2023 - India area 🇮🇳 India Strategic Profile:  Longstanding defense partner Key Ports:   Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Chennai Objectives: Technical support for Russian-supplied platforms (S-400, Talwar-class frigates, Ka-series helicopters) Informal logistical access for Russian naval and merchant shipping Ongoing cooperation in nuclear energy and defense industrial transfers Naval interoperability via INDRA NAVY joint exercises 🇻🇳 Vietnam Strategic Profile:  Cold War-era ally with Russian-equipped naval forces Key Ports:   Cam Ranh Bay (historically used by Soviet Navy), Hai Phong Objectives: Depot-level maintenance for Russian-origin vessels and submarines Resupply and technical exchanges under existing security agreements Potential fallback maritime access node in the South China Sea 🇲🇲 Myanmar Strategic Profile:  Defense and counter-Western alignment Key Ports:   Yangon, Kyaukpyu Objectives: Delivery of Yak-130 aircraft, air defense systems, and ISR platforms Military advisor presence and bilateral arms logistics Unofficial maritime access under opaque port arrangements 🇮🇩 Indonesia Strategic Profile:  Non-aligned defense consumer with procurement interests Key Ports:   Surabaya, Tanjung Priok Objectives: Suspended arms procurement (e.g., Su-35) due to CAATSA constraints Civilian port access for dual-use logistics under commercial pretext Ongoing strategic dialogue within ASEAN-Russia framework 🇮🇷 Iran Strategic Profile:  High-level military-technological alliance Key Ports:   Bandar Abbas, Chabahar Objectives: Transfer hub for UAVs, precision munitions, and electronic warfare components Joint naval drills with China and Russia Critical node on Russia’s "Southern Corridor" to the Indian Ocean 🇨🇳 China Strategic Profile:  Top-tier strategic partner across economic and military dimensions Key Ports:   Shanghai, Qingdao, Guangzhou Objectives: Military-industrial cooperation and energy logistics Dual-use transit for sanctioned cargo Participation in coordinated maritime drills (e.g., Sea Interaction) Strategic Implications: With the erosion of Syria’s utility as a maritime logistics hub, Russia is now forced to extend the operational range of its merchant and auxiliary fleets. This shift necessitates enhanced blue-water logistics autonomy , including ship-to-ship refueling, offshore staging, and reliance on partner-state port access —some overt, some unofficial. These Indo-Pacific nodes represent the Kremlin’s evolving logistics doctrine, emphasizing resilience, dispersion , and global engagement through flexible bilateral corridors . LADY D Off Port Said: Russia’s Post-Syria Shift Initially assessed to be en route to Tartus — Russia’s long-standing naval logistics hub in Syria — the LADY D  now appears to have bypassed the Levant entirely. Instead, OSINT and AIS data suggest a probable onward passage through the Suez Canal, with likely destinations being India, China, or Southeast Asian nations. This represents a significant shift in vector for Russian military maritime logistics, which traditionally operated on shorter loops within the Mediterranean theater under the protective umbrella of the Syrian corridor. Notably, LADY D  is currently anchored among several tankers in a known offshore transfer zone, north of the Suez approach. This pattern is consistent with previous Russian-flagged logistics vessels such as MV Ascalon  and MV Maia-1 , which engaged in ship-to-ship (STS)  operations to extend range and operational endurance — a standard yet strategically meaningful procedure. These STS refueling or resupply maneuvers enable Russian ships to sustain longer transits without port calls, minimizing exposure to international monitoring and port state controls. The move away from Tartus is not a routine deviation. With the weakening of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Moscow’s progressive military drawdown in Syria, Russia can no longer rely on the Levant as a logistics node for its military presence in the Mediterranean and broader MENA region. As a result, ships like LADY D  now face extended deployments, requiring robust sustainment capabilities and coordination across partner ports or neutral logistical corridors. What this means strategically is twofold: Russia is recalibrating its naval logistics to project power eastward , toward Asia-Pacific partners — a move that fits with broader diplomatic efforts aimed at deepening ties with India, China, and ASEAN-aligned states. The absence of a Mediterranean hub stretches Russia’s naval logistics , reducing operational efficiency and increasing dependence on extended blue-water supply lines and non-traditional support methods such as STS fueling and offshore coordination. While such long-haul transits might appear standard, the implications for regional security architecture are clear. Russia is adapting — not retreating — and the LADY D  is evidence of an increasingly globalized, adaptive maritime logistics strategy. As Western navies and analysts continue to monitor Russian fleet and merchant movements, understanding the logistical adaptations post-Syria is critical to anticipating Moscow’s next strategic plays.

The Russian-flagged merchant vessel Baltic Leader , previously sanctioned for its involvement in illicit arms transfers, is currently on a south-easterly course toward the Libyan coast. As of 11 June 2025 at 11:43 UTC, the vessel was located at coordinates 34.2828°N, 15.6258°E, maintaining a heading of 133° at a speed of 9.4 knots. Estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the port of Benghazi is 12 June 2025 at 14:55 UTC. The Baltic Leader  is operated by MG-Flot LLC and leased via PSB Leasing, an entity closely linked to Russia’s defense-industrial complex and sanctioned for its role in military logistics support. https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/transport/ships/99 https://x.com/scandura/status/1932750441013551273 The vessel recently conducted offload operations in Conakry, Guinea, where open-source intelligence (OSINT) indicates it delivered military materiel and dual-use equipment of Russian origin. https://x.com/RFNOSBlog This movement aligns with a notable event on 26 May 2025, when the Libyan National Army (LNA) conducted a high-visibility military parade south of Benghazi. Imagery analysis and field reporting from the parade identified the presence of Russian-manufactured armored vehicles and associated support equipment, suggesting recent inflows of Russian defense material into eastern Libya. https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1926951238467190828 The convergence of these timelines and maritime activities suggests a resumption—or escalation—of Russian military-logistics operations supporting proxy or partner forces in North Africa. This reflects a strategic recalibration of Russian force posture and influence projection following the drawdown of assets from Syria and the reorientation of operational reach within the Mediterranean basin. The arrival of the Baltic Leader  in Benghazi is tactically significant, potentially marking the reactivation of a maritime supply line similar in function to the former "Syrian Express"—but now adapted for the Libyan theatre. This emerging logistics corridor enhances Russia's capacity for strategic sustainment and forward presence in the central Mediterranean, reinforcing its alignment with LNA forces under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. For NATO and its partners, this activity merits close monitoring. It indicates a shift in Russian maritime military logistics toward North Africa, potentially impacting regional stability and challenging freedom of navigation and strategic balance in the southern flank. The use of sanctioned commercial vessels to deliver military cargo underlines the continued exploitation of hybrid logistical tactics by the Russian Federation to circumvent international restrictions and project power in contested regions.

Russia continues to refine and expand its maritime logistics strategy in West Africa, using sanctioned merchant vessels to conduct discreet military shipments to allied regimes. The latest delivery of Russian armored assets—broadcast on Malian state television and including Spartak APCs  and other tactical vehicles—appears to mark the third successful military transfer via sea since January 2025 , utilizing a logistical route through Guinea’s Port of Conakry . This trend underscores Russia’s growing commitment to sustaining partner forces in the Sahel, particularly the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), now operating in tandem with Moscow’s restructured paramilitary presence, the “Africa Corps” —a formal evolution of the former Wagner Group. POST: Malian junta holds parade in #Bamako with "new cutting-edge weapons" purchased in Russia.(Source: Ivoirowsky ) POST: This convoy is a little different in the vehicles sent to Mali. I can see some unusual vehicles, notably : - EW BTRs : Borissoglebsk-2 system - Vystrels - M - Artillery pieces : 122D30 / 152D20 Electronic Warfare vehicles in particular catch my attention, and might be sent directly to Africa Corps as part of sensitive vehicle. This convoy in general seems way more adapted to fighting terrorists, unlike the previous ones. (Source: casus belli ) POST: Russian vessels MV Patria and MV Baltic Leader spotted stationary off Conakry . Not just a port call — signs point to the delivery of weapons and military equipment.  Moscow is deepening its military footprint in West Africa. (Source: RFNOSBlog ) MV Baltic Leader MV Patria Updated Vessel Movement Analysis As of early June 2025, OSINT and AIS maritime tracking indicate a dynamic shift in the movement of the key vessels involved in this Russian logistical network: MV Baltic Leader : Having loitered off Conakry for several days—likely during offloading operations—it is now sailing northward , currently navigating along the West African coast. Its trajectory suggests a probable return to the Baltic Sea region , potentially for resupply or additional cargo loading. MV Patria : No longer approaching Conakry, the Patria  is currently east of the Strait of Gibraltar , actively transiting back toward the Baltic basin . This repositioning may indicate the completion of a delivery cycle or a tactical reassignment of shipping assets. MV Siyanie Severa : Currently stationed offshore near Lagos, Nigeria , in holding position. Its proximity to key Nigerian maritime infrastructure is noteworthy given recent upticks in Russian-Nigerian diplomatic contacts. The coordinated presence and now sequential withdrawal of these vessels strongly indicate a multi-vessel rotational maritime delivery system , likely orchestrated to sustain materiel flow while minimizing port exposure times and satellite detection windows. Military Cargo Assessment The recent cargo delivered to Mali includes: Spartak 4x4 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) : Modular wheeled platforms designed for convoy protection, light infantry mobility, and internal security operations in irregular warfare zones. MRAP-like armored vehicles  and logistical trucks , likely intended to reinforce counter-insurgency operations in central and northern Mali. Potential military-grade communications and EW support gear , based on historical precedent from similar deliveries. These assets are assessed to significantly enhance the Africa Corps’ operational flexibility and the FAMa’s capacity to project power beyond core urban areas. Strategic and Geopolitical Implications Russia's ability to deliver advanced military equipment using sanctioned commercial shipping  demonstrates growing confidence in its maritime logistics strategy. By leveraging under-regulated ports such as Conakry and exploiting maritime legal gray zones , Moscow continues to support partner states with high strategic value: Mali : Host of Africa Corps deployments, operational hub for counter-insurgency efforts, and a key node in Russia’s Sahel strategy. Guinea : Emerging as a logistical enabler due to its port accessibility, political alignment, and limited Western naval oversight. Nigeria (Lagos area) : Potential new maritime waypoint for Russian vessels, warranting close monitoring by Western maritime surveillance assets. The realignment of ship positions back toward the Baltic hints at a closed-loop supply model , wherein vessels rotate between Russian ports and West African offload points, avoiding prolonged exposure and adapting routes to evade detection. Conclusion Russia’s maritime military logistics chain—anchored by sanctioned cargo vessels like Baltic Leader , Siyanie Severa , and Patria —is now a proven delivery method for deploying arms, vehicles, and potentially personnel across Africa’s west coast. For defense analysts, this represents a critical development in Russia’s hybrid expeditionary strategy , blending state logistics with sanctioned commercial assets to maintain strategic depth and extend influence in Africa’s contested security environment.

Recent Russian naval movements involving a Steregushchiy-class corvette Boikiy (532) and the merchant vessel SIYANIE SEVERA (IMO: 9250385, General Cargo Ship)  highlight Moscow’s growing use of integrated maritime operations—combining military and civilian assets—to project power and reinforce strategic partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea. A Corvette and a Cargo Ship: Strategic Messaging at Sea In recent days, military analysts have observed a notable Russian naval maneuver off the West African coast. A Steregushchiy-class corvette , a modern multirole surface combatant optimized for littoral operations and anti-surface/anti-submarine warfare, made a port call in Nigeria —a clear diplomatic signal 29 May 2025 - Nigeria near Lagos On May 29, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, A.L. Podelyshev, alongside military attaché S.N. Sivachev, visited the Steregushchiy-class corvette Boikiy , anchored in Nigerian territorial waters near Lagos. During the visit, the ship’s commanding officer conducted a detailed tour, briefing the delegation on the vessel’s advanced combat capabilities and operational role, underscoring the strategic significance of the deployment in strengthening Russo-Nigerian military ties. Post : x.com Simultaneously, the Russian-flagged merchant vessel Siyanie Severa , reportedly under naval escort by the same corvette, previously docked at Bata , Equatorial Guinea. The Russian-flagged merchant vessel Siyanie Severa (IMO 9250385) was docked in the port of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, from 28 to 30 May 2025 . There is no public confirmation of whether it loaded or unloaded any military or logistics materials during its stay. Port of Bata, Equatorial Guinea After departing Bata, the vessel headed to Lagos, Nigeria, with an estimated arrival time (ETA) of 12:00 local time on June 2 . The Siyanie Severa is most likely to join the Steregushchiy Boikiy-class corvette, currently operating near Nigerian territorial waters, suggesting a continuation of the joint maritime operation. Travel data vessel Siyanie Severa 29 May - Lagos, Nigeria Intelligence sources suggest that during the stop in Bata, the vessel likely offloaded military hardware and logistics equipment , potentially destined for Russian private military contractors (PMCs)  or local allied forces. This indicates not only a military logistics operation  but also a strategically orchestrated maritime presence  in an increasingly contested region. Naval Diplomacy: The Fleet as an Extension of Statecraft Russia’s strategic use of combined naval and commercial assets  fits into a broader doctrine of maritime diplomacy, whereby the navy acts as a forward-deployed instrument of state power. This model has been used previously in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and more recently, the Red Sea. The Nigerian port visit by a Russian combat vessel—likely coordinated at high political levels—serves as a maritime signaling operation , underscoring the evolving bilateral defense cooperation  between Moscow and Abuja. In an era where Russia seeks alternative partnerships beyond Western-aligned blocs, Nigeria emerges as a regional pivot —economically powerful, militarily relevant, and politically significant. The warship’s presence thus constitutes more than just a routine port call: it is a naval diplomacy mission , conveying both commitment and capability. Bata: A Tactical Foothold on the Gulf of Guinea The port of Bata , in Equatorial Guinea, has gained prominence as a logistics node  in Russia’s growing maritime posture in Central and West Africa. Though lacking in scale compared to major global ports, Bata offers strategic depth, plausible deniability, and limited foreign oversight—making it ideal for low-visibility military resupply and forward staging . The docking of Siyanie Severa —reportedly transporting armored vehicles, materiel, and possibly C4ISR assets —suggests an effort to pre-position capabilities  in the region. These assets could support Russian-aligned PMCs , now restructured post-Wagner under official Kremlin control, who serve as unofficial force multipliers  in states with unstable governance or anti-Western orientations. This logistical operation likely included the use of roll-on/roll-off capabilities , containerized arms shipments , and discreet offloading under the cover of dual-use cargo classification—tactics consistent with Russian hybrid maritime strategy. Strategic Outlook: Maritime Access as a Force Multiplier The deployment of Russian naval assets to African waters—especially in a combined civilian-military configuration —illustrates a long-term strategic pivot. Moscow is leveraging sea lines of communication (SLOCs)  to project influence where Western presence is either reduced or diplomatically constrained. With Bata as a potential logistics hub  and Nigeria as a high-value diplomatic partner, Russia appears to be establishing a blue-water vector  for influence in the Gulf of Guinea. This corridor enables secure maritime supply chains , presence operations , and potential contingency deployments . In this paradigm, merchant vessels no longer merely carry goods—they deliver geopolitical payloads . Warships, in turn, act not just as deterrents but as platforms for bilateral engagement and power projection .

Heightened Tensions in the Baltic Sea In recent days, Russia’s Baltic Fleet has launched large-scale exercises  involving over 20 warships and 3,000 personnel , marking a significant escalation in regional naval activity. More critically, Russian naval forces have begun actively escorting shadow fleet oil tankers , a move that signals a strategic shift in Moscow’s maritime posture—placing increased emphasis on the protection of commercial and strategic economic interests. This integration of military and illicit commercial operations captures growing international attention, highlighting the Baltic Sea’s transformation into a high-stakes security flashpoint. Overview In 2025, the Baltic Sea has emerged as a hotspot in the evolving confrontation between Russia and NATO. Central to this dynamic is Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” —a network of over 1,300 aging, AIS-disconnected vessels, many operating under flags of convenience and used to circumvent EU and G7 sanctions imposed after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Approximately 50% of Russia’s oil exports via this fleet transit through the Baltic , turning the region into a contested maritime domain. These vessels not only pose environmental and navigational risks but are increasingly linked to hybrid operations , including espionage and sabotage. Operational Tactics The shadow fleet primarily uses Russian ports like Primorsk  and Ust-Luga , employing ship-to-ship (STS)  transfers to obfuscate cargo origin. In December 2024 alone, these ports facilitated over 5.5 million tons  of oil exports. Many vessels lack proper insurance, transponders, or maintenance, increasing the risk of collision or environmental disaster. Escalation: The Jaguar Incident On 13 May 2025, Estonian naval forces escorted the Liberia-flagged Jaguar, suspected of operating near sensitive infrastructure. Russia responded by dispatching a Su-35 fighter, which briefly violated NATO airspace. This incident underscores Moscow’s willingness to militarily defend non-flagged commercial assets tied to its interests. Hybrid Threats: Sabotage and Surveillance Several shadow fleet vessels are suspected of submarine cable interference and intelligence gathering . The Eagle S  was linked to the December 2024 damage of the Estlink2  power cable between Estonia and Finland. Swedish naval intelligence has reported unusual comms equipment  aboard certain tankers, classifying them as potential “spy ships.” Environmental Risks The fleet’s aging vessels are a ticking ecological time bomb. In January 2025, the Eventin  ran aground off Rügen, causing a localized oil spill. Earlier incidents in the Black Sea demonstrated the broader risk of unregulated maritime logistics , particularly in semi-enclosed, ecologically sensitive areas like the Baltic. NATO & EU Countermeasures In response, NATO launched Operation Baltic Sentry  in January 2025 to protect subsea infrastructure and monitor illegal maritime activity. The Nordic Warden initiative , introduced in April, integrates AI surveillance tools  to track shadow fleet behavior and potential threats. The EU has sanctioned over 350 vessels , though enforcement remains difficult due to complex ownership structures and the use of shell companies. Russian Naval Involvement Russia’s Baltic Fleet  plays a protective role, conducting drone and submarine defense drills  around shadow fleet tankers in April 2025. This raises legal and operational challenges, as military assets are increasingly deployed to escort suspect civilian vessels. Strategic Outlook The Baltic is becoming a flashpoint. With Finland and Sweden now NATO members , Russia’s maneuvering space is limited. Continued armed protection of non-flagged vessels increases the risk of direct confrontation. Conclusion Russia’s shadow fleet poses a multi-domain threat —combining sanctions evasion, environmental risk, and hybrid warfare. As maritime boundaries blur, the Baltic is evolving into a critical front for gray zone conflict , demanding coordinated NATO and EU maritime security strategies.

The frigate Grigorovich did not pass by the STROG as did the vessel ASCALON (IMO:9198226 - Last contact 12 MAR near Malta - by @TiaFarris10 ) , they could still be in the MED. The weather conditions are favorable and considering the distance they could be in transit at this time. By @TiaFarris10 Dangerous manoeuvre in the sea by the Russian cargo ship   ASCALON  near a collision with a foreign cargo ship . Exclusive photos of the cargo ship   ASCALON  near Malta prove that the Syrian Express convoy did indeed split in two (photos taken on 10th March 2025). Category Transportation of military cargo Weapons and military equipment Vessel information Involved in the transportation of weapons for the Russian Federation, it is considered one of the participants in the so-called "Syrian Express" (a supply route to Syria from Russian ports on the Black Sea (Novorossiysk) through the Bosphorus Strait). The vessel has been repeatedly captured on satellite images at the Novorossiysk naval base.In 2018, it delivered missiles for the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia to the PRC.The owner of the vessel is the sanctioned Russian maritime shipping company LLC "M Leasing"(TIN9701173086).In May 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on the vessels of LLC "M Leasing" (including "Ascalon") involved in the transportation of weapons. Ports visited Al Iskandariyh (Alexandria) (Egypt), Conakry (Guinea), Gelendzhgic (Russian Federation), Novorossiysk (Russian Federation), Oran (Algeria), Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo), Sankt-Peterburg (Russian Federation), Zeytinburnu (Turkey), Kronstadt (Russian Federation), Algeria (Algeria), Tin Can Island (Nigeria), Sheskharis (Russian Federation), Khalifa (UAE) Shipowner (IMO / country / date) LLC "M Leasing" (6246853 / rf / 02.09.2021) https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-QRwDBWGMrmDwjbQzjFdYFh/ M Leasing LLC  is a Russian shipping company providing logistical support to the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In particular, M Leasing LLC is involved in a military transportation network of Russian cargo vessels shipping North Korean armaments from Pyongyang to military facilities in the Russian port of Dunai. Subsequently, North Korean munitions transported by M Leasing LLC are transferred to a munitions depot in the town of Tikhoretsk on Russia’s western border to be deployed in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, M Leasing LLC is supporting materially the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine. Ship: Angara (IMO 9179842) Adler (IMO 9179854) Ascalon (IMO 9198226)

Since December 2024, the RFN no longer has a naval base in the Mediterranean Sea. Despite this particular situation, the RFN decides to send ships and submarines in the Mediterranean. The naval presence allows to maintain open economic and logistic relations with the partner countries of Russia which are bordering on the Mediterranean. It also allows control of traffic to and from the Black Sea by Russian vessels. At this time of transition, the RFN benefits from the support of some countries such as Egypt and Algeria. In the future, we may see some ships also in Libya where on several occasions they have made diplomatic visits. From February there are new entries in the Mediterranean... a Kilo class submarine accompanied by a support ship ( Krasnodar and Evgenit Churv ) The two warships made a direct voyage to the Syrian coast. During this stretch, they made a probable stop in an area north-east of Libya (Tobruk) and another one north of Egypt (Alexandria). TUG and SUB Movements from February 12th to March 4th 2025 What happened in the previous months? In December 2024 Krasnodar  (B-265), Russian Improved ‘Kilo’-class (Project 636.3), demonstrated its operational readiness after a period in the shipyard in Kronstadt. The Russian Ministry of Defence reported on 23 December 2024 that the submarine had completed a torpedo-firing serial in the Baltic Sea, operating with support from Kaliningrad. On 3 February 2025 the submarine Krasnodar  moved through the Great Belt towards the Skagerrak strait above Denmark together with the Sliva-class deep sea tug Evgeniy Churov  (SB-921).  The duo has now passed through the English Channel and, according to open sources, was outside Portuguese territorial waters to the west of the Iberian Peninsula on the morning of 11 February. Strait passage of Gibraltar - Tug Evgenit Churv & Submarine Krasnodar Post X: Feb 12, 2025 at 19:20 hrs (by @PeterFerrary ) What happened after 12 February? On 15 February, the submarine Krasnodar was sighted north of Algeria, western Mediterranean Sea along with the tugboat Evgeniy Churov . On 17 February, the Russian submarine Krasnodar passed off the southern coast of Sicily as it continued its eastward journey. Once again, multiple NATO assets took turns monitoring its movements. ( https://www.itamilradar.com/2025/02/17/eyes-still-on-the-russian-submarine/ ) Multiple NATO assets took turns monitoring Krasnodar On 24 February, they were brought back to a position north Marsa Matruh, Egypt. Below some IR images of the two boats. Tug Evgeniy Churov (SB-921) Submarine Krasnodar B-265 The Spanish Navy has identified the submarine Krasnodar in the eastern Mediterranean. The Spaniards did not report many details about its location and type of activity. Images showing the two boats standing still were published. Most likely they were engaged in logistic support operations. The submarine was later sighted while travelling with the tugboat to the port of Alexandria, Egypt. Source ( https://maritime-executive.com/article/spanish-navy-monitors-transit-of-russian-attack-submarine ) Russian attack submarine and a Russian tug (by Spanish Navy) Port stops for logistics and handling activities Alternatively, Algeria could provide assistance and logistical support to the RFN. The Algerian navy operates a base for its 'Kilo' submarines in Mers El-Kébir. Since these belong to the same series of Krasnodar - 'Kilo' submarines modified by project 636.3 - there could be synergies in terms of supply and maintenance. Tobruk could be a possible Russian base in Libya. Russia has supported Khalifa Haftar, the Commander of the Libyan National Army, by providing weapons and training assistance. Moreover, Libya could be a gateway to support various Russian private Military companies in Africa. There has also been speculation about a possible Russian naval base in the Red Sea at Port Sudan. Source ( https://euro-sd.com/2025/02/major-news/42534/a-russian-sub-back-to-the-med/ ) Conclusions In the next article we will analyse the movements and the probable areas of activity and patrolling --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Document produced with the aid of an open source used with posts by X by: @ItaMilRadar @Romanovichphoto @te3ej @PeterFerrary )