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The Russian-flagged general cargo vessel S. Kuznetsov (IMO 9210359), built in 2001, has recently departed the port of Tartus after a three-day stopover. Notably, the vessel was moored in the commercial section of the Syrian port, rather than in the area previously used by the Russian Navy. According to AIS data, S. Kuznetsov is now underway in the Eastern Mediterranean at a speed of approximately 11 knots. While its AIS destination remains listed as “For Order,” current movement patterns suggest a potential course toward the Black Sea. At this stage, however, the vessel’s final destination and cargo remain unconfirmed. This development comes amid ongoing monitoring of Russian commercial and auxiliary maritime traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean. Analysts continue to assess the purpose of such voyages, particularly those involving extended port calls in Syria and subsequent northbound movements that could indicate logistical or resupply activity linked to regional operations.

The Russian Ro-Ro cargo ship LADY MARIIA , built in 2000 and currently sailing under the Russian flag, continues to attract attention for its unusual movements across the Mediterranean. After a series of calls in Indian ports earlier this autumn, the vessel made a two-day stop north of Port Said, most likely for ship-to-ship refueling—an increasingly common maneuver among Russian-flagged vessels operating outside conventional logistics routes. Now LADY MARIIA has reached Oran, on Algeria’s western coast. AIS data shows the ship stationary in port, where another Russian vessel, the ADLER —previously identified in connection with questionable or illicit cargo transfers—is also present. The simultaneous presence of these two ships raises new questions about Moscow’s maritime logistics in the Mediterranean and North Africa. It is still uncertain whether LADY MARIIA will remain at Oran’s commercial terminal or continue a short distance west toward Mers el-Kebir, the Algerian naval base with restricted access. The coming days should clarify whether this stop is a routine port call or part of a broader pattern of strategic coordination between Russian cargo vessels operating in the region.

The East Mediterranean theatre remains a focal point for monitoring illicit shipping activity, particularly concerning vessels linked to sanctioned Russian entities. The general cargo ship S.KUZNETSOV (IMO 9210359), flagged under Russia and confirmed to be owned/operated by a US-sanctioned Russian company (OFAC designated), is currently executing a transit of significant intelligence concern. As of the latest reporting, the vessel is navigating the East Mediterranean at a speed of 10.8 knots, with an Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) of November 8 at 12:00 for its declared destination: Tartus, Syria . Anomalous Voyage Profile: From the Arctic Fringe to Russian Forward Base The voyage history strongly amplifies the grounds for suspicion. The S.KUZNETSOV departed its last known port, Pevek, Russia , nearly 48 days prior on September 19. Pevek, an isolated port on the East Siberian Sea and a critical node on the Northern Sea Route, is not a conventional staging point for trade destined for the Levant. A transit duration spanning almost seven weeks from the Russian Far East/Arctic region to the Mediterranean immediately flags the voyage as non-routine commercial traffic. The most critical indicator, however, remains the destination: Tartus . Tartus: The Logistical Nexus Tartus is not merely a commercial port; it functions as the primary logistical and technical support facility for the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean. The arrival of a vessel linked to a sanctioned entity at this strategic naval asset suggests a deliberate attempt to leverage this location for the transfer of restricted materiel. The confluence of factors—sanctioned ownership, an atypical long-haul route from an Arctic port, and the final destination—leads to a high-confidence assessment that the S.KUZNETSOV is engaged in activity designed to circumvent international sanctions, likely supporting Russian military or dual-use requirements associated with its overseas deployments. Analysis must now focus on post-arrival surveillance at Tartus to determine the nature of the cargo being offloaded.

The cargo vessel HAV DOLPHIN , flagged to Antigua & Barbuda  (IMO 9073854), has drawn renewed attention after altering its route in recent days. Initially tracked in the Baltic Sea—where Finnish authorities suspected it might be involved in covert surveillance operations—the ship has since changed course and is now bound for Fos-sur-Mer, France , before reportedly heading to Avilés, Spain , with an estimated arrival on November 14 . The HAV DOLPHIN, built in 1993, has been observed navigating near key undersea infrastructure, raising security concerns across several European monitoring agencies. Given the vessel’s unusual route changes and prior suspicions of intelligence-related activity, authorities emphasize the need for continued close observation of its movements.

The Russian general cargo vessel S. KUZNETSOV (IMO 9210359) , operated by the Open Joint Stock Company Northern Shipping Company (OJSC “Severnoye Morskoe Parokhodstvo”) , is reportedly en route from Pevek (Chukotka, Arctic Russia)  toward Tartus, Syria  — a key Russian naval logistics hub in the eastern Mediterranean. The Northern Shipping Company , headquartered in Arkhangelsk , is a sanctioned entity identified as affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defence , notably engaged in transportation contracts involving military and dual-use cargo . Multiple open-source intelligence (OSINT) databases, including FleetLeaks  and War & Sanctions , list the company among those supporting Russia’s defense logistics operations. Origin Point: Arctic Military Logistics Node Pevek, located along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) , serves as a strategic Arctic outpost. In recent years, Moscow has significantly expanded infrastructure and military presence across the NSR, integrating Arctic ports into its dual-use logistics framework . Northern Shipping Company is directly involved in these operations, acting as a maritime carrier for defense-related cargo and infrastructure projects commissioned by the Russian MoD . Destination Tartus – Russia’s Mediterranean Anchor Point AIS tracking data indicates Tartus  as the vessel’s destination. The port of Tartus hosts the Russian Navy’s only permanent Mediterranean base , serving as a logistical and resupply center for operations in Syria and beyond. Given the vessel’s classification and ownership, analysts assess a high probability of military or strategic cargo  onboard — potentially including heavy equipment, engineering materials, or logistics components supporting Russian and Syrian military infrastructure. Ports visited Alexandria (Egypt), Berdyansk (Ukraine), Kaliningrad (Russia), Murmansk (Russia), Novorossiysk (Russia), Samsun (Turkey), Sankt-Petersburg (Russia), Zeytinburnu (Turkey), Belokamenka (Russia), Dikson (Russia), Archangel (Russia), Sheskharis (Russia), El-Dekheila (Egypt), Gelendzhik (Russia) Operational Assessment The S. KUZNETSOV’s transit underscores Moscow’s Arctic–Mediterranean logistics corridor , linking its northern military-industrial assets with expeditionary operations in the Middle East. This pattern illustrates a sustained logistical continuity  within Russia’s global supply network, leveraging civilian-flagged vessels under sanctioned operators to sustain overseas military commitments. Outlook As the S. KUZNETSOV approaches the Mediterranean, Western maritime surveillance and sanction-monitoring entities are expected to track its movement closely. The voyage exemplifies how Russia continues to adapt its commercial fleet for strategic logistics , maintaining critical supply lines despite ongoing international restrictions.

In recent months, the operational patterns of the MV Lauga (IMO 9111060) have attracted increased scrutiny from intelligence and maritime security analysts, particularly regarding its activity in the Ionian Sea and recurrent port calls along the West African coast. In September, the vessel conducted a transit through the Ionian Sea marked by an uncharacteristic course deviation and significant reduction in speed—maneuvers indicative of deliberate operational intent rather than routine navigation. Such behavior may be linked to covert logistics operations, potentially involving the illicit transport of arms or contraband cargo to strategically significant African ports. A recent investigative report by Meduza highlighted suspicious activity associated with the MV Lauga, including possible deployments of surveillance drones , further amplifying concerns over the vessel’s operational profile. Within this framework, the vessel’s trajectory through the Ionian Sea could correspond to an ISR ( Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance ) mission, possibly involving underwater drone operations, given the critical submarine cable infrastructure traversing the area, including cables originating from Israel. While there is no definitive evidence directly connecting the MV Lauga to Russian governmental agencies or the Ministry of Defense, its operational patterns and West African port calls strongly suggest a potential role in supporting military or paramilitary activities within the region. Considering the strategic importance of the visited ports and the historical context of Russian military engagement in West Africa, the MV Lauga’s movements warrant sustained monitoring and detailed intelligence analysis to assess its probable involvement in regional military logistics networks and suspected ISR drone operations. Routes operated by the LAUGA vessel from 2023 to 2025 (Global fishing watch): Report by Meduza: An invisible maritime menace The Russian vessel Lauga  is suspected of conducting covert ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) operations in the North Sea, deploying unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to surveil critical German military infrastructure. On 17 May 2025, a German patrol craft detected multiple UAS swarming around Lauga  near Borkum Island, indicating active drone deployment capabilities. Although a subsequent inspection in Belgium yielded no concrete evidence, intelligence assessments have linked Lauga  to Russian naval logistics hubs in Tartus, Syria, and to Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation. The vessel's frequent port calls in Iran and Turkmenistan further suggest non-commercial routes aligned with potential strategic intelligence missions. These patterns underscore concerns about the exploitation of ostensibly civilian maritime assets for clandestine military ISR activities that evade conventional detection. Last two months (August - September 2025) Russian activity in West Africa reveals a notable increase in maritime traffic. The LAUGA - 9111060, recently observed Cotonou and Bissau, likely serves as a logistical asset supporting Moscow's military. Last month (September 2025) Submarine Cable Map

Published: September 7, 2025 In yet another display of the Russian Federation’s reliance on aging commercial vessels for military logistics, the Ro-Ro cargo ship ADLER (IMO 9179854) —a 27-year-old vessel flying the Russian flag —has resumed its westbound route after mechanical failures halted its mission in the Western Mediterranean. Ro-Ro cargo ship ADLER The Vessel: Aging Backbone of Shadow Supply Chains Built in 1998 , ADLER is operated by the sanctioned Russian maritime logistics company LLC “M Leasing” (TIN: 9701173086). Despite its age and poor mechanical reliability, it remains a functional element in Russia’s ongoing strategy of using dual-use civilian vessels for covert military transport missions —an operational necessity given the constraints imposed by international sanctions and maritime tracking. Cargo and Sourcing Activity The vessel departed St. Petersburg on August 11, 2025 , after a 17-day layover at the Morskoy Fasad terminal , a known embarkation point for sensitive and military-related cargo. Morskoy Fasad terminal According to AIS-based draught readings, ADLER went from a draught of 5.2 m to 5.9 m **, indicating a loading of ~1,000–1,300 tonnes of cargo. This corresponds to an estimated: 35–60 TEUs (20-ft containers) or 36–50 FEUs (40-ft containers) Alternatively, a mix of cargoes could also be loaded: 15 containers and 75 military vehicles , including likely variants such as BTR-82A APCs or MT-LB armored transports . Such logistics patterns are consistent with previous Ro-Ro deployments moving military material through the Black Sea-Baltic-Mediterranean route under commercial cover. Mechanical Failures and Tow Events On August 25 at 01:00 UTC , ADLER reported loss of navigational control , indicating possible engine or steering gear failure —not uncommon for older vessels in constant use without dry-dock rotation. Subsequently, the vessel remained adrift 20 nautical miles west of Porto, Portugal , until August 29 , when it was taken under tow by the Spanish-flagged tug ROMA . ( @claudialanz on BlueSky ) After reaching a holding position north of Al Hoceima, Morocco (an area recently used by other Russian replenishment units), the vessel anchored on September 4 and began its final leg toward Oran, Algeria on September 9 — still under tow. Satellite images during the tow north of Al Hoceima September 4 th, Ro Ro ADLER - Tug ROMA Last position as of September 7th , Ro Ro ADLER - Tug ROMA Strategic Observations * No Russian Navy escort was observed during the journey. * The port of Oran (Algeria) is widely believed to be the final destination, although this was not confirmed prior to the failure event. * The use of unescorted, mechanically degraded vessels to transport military cargo through contested waters reflects both Russia’s stretched naval logistics and the chronic underinvestment in auxiliary fleet maintenance . Conclusion: Maritime Weak Points The ADLER case illustrates a critical vulnerability in the Russian maritime supply chain: a dependence on aging commercial hulls , insufficiently maintained and operating at the edge of reliability , yet tasked with critical supply roles. Open-source maritime intelligence monitoring  of these slow-moving vessels continues to reveal key patterns: predictable routing , frequent mechanical vulnerabilities , and the absence of military escort  all underscore the structural weaknesses of Russia’s logistics operations in the Mediterranean. These observations, derived from AIS data and publicly available sources, highlight the operational strain on a fleet increasingly reliant on aging commercial assets for strategic transport missions. 📎 *Tracked via open AIS data and corroborated by independent maritime observers.* 📡 Source: [ @claudialanz on BlueSky ](https://bsky.app/profile/claudialanz.bsky.social/post/3lxuurcgtfs2x)

Date: August 19, 2025 On August 7, 2025, the Udaloy-class  destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov  exited the Baltic Sea via the Great Belt Strait, beginning a coordinated escort mission. Udaloy-class  destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov  exited the Baltic Sea Three days later, on August 10 at 12:50 UTC, the ship was visually confirmed in the Dover Strait after a 695-nautical-mile transit at 10 knots. August 10 at 12:50 UTC - Vice Admiral Kulakov - Dover Strait At the same time, two Russian-flagged support vessels — the RO-RO cargo ship Sparta  and the tanker Skobelev  — were tracked northeast-bound off Brest, maintaining similar speed. Their converging positions and timing strongly suggest a pre-planned rendezvous and formation of a naval convoy , roughly 50 NM north of the French coastline. Escorted Transit: Strategic Assurance After the link-up, Kulakov  assumed escort duties for the two support vessels through one of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world. This configuration — destroyer + RO-RO + tanker — hadn’t been observed in the Channel for months, signaling renewed Russian interest in secure, protected sea-based logistics . On August 12 in the morning hours, the group maneuvered off the UK coastline, pausing roughly 18 NM offshore for around five hours. This tactical deviation likely served as a controlled pause for technical trials, refueling, or systems calibration , and simultaneously kept the formation outside high-traffic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)  and NATO surveillance corridors. On August 12 - Russian naval group's staging point Visual Clues: Cargo Profile Changes Tanker Skobelev - July 1, passage outbound from the Baltic Tanker Skobelev - August 12, passage inbound the Baltic Imagery from public maritime observers and satellite platforms reveals notable differences between outbound and return transits. On August 12, Skobelev  appeared significantly lighter under the Great Belt  compared to her July 1 passage outbound from the Baltic — indicating probable fuel or liquid cargo delivery. Sparta , meanwhile, showed changes in deck configuration: missing were the white ISO containers  seen on July 1, replaced by a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) , jet-powered and typically used for coastal patrols. RHIBs of this class are known to operate from the Russian naval facility in Tartus, Syria , where Sparta  had previously docked — suggesting reverse transport or post-mission recovery. Ro Ro Sparta - August 12, passage inbound the Baltic Escort + Tanker = Logistics Force Multiplier This operation highlights a refined Russian maritime logistics model: civilian support vessels operating under direct naval escort , with embedded refueling capability. While Russia possesses specialized replenishment ships, using a civilian tanker like Skobelev  offers strategic ambiguity , lower visibility, and diplomatic cover. At the same time, the presence of Kulakov  ensures layered protection — a clear message that Russia won’t risk strategic cargo movement , even in peacetime transit through Western waters. Conclusion This Channel transit under escort reflects a deliberate evolution in Russian naval logistics : the blending of commercial and military assets into protected, multi-role convoys . As Moscow recalibrates its approach to long-range resupply and force projection, expect further use of this model in contested maritime zones, where visibility is high, and risk is increasing.

Date:  August 15, 2025 Category:  Maritime Intelligence | Military Logistics | Sanctions Evasion Summary On August 14, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reportedly struck the Russian cargo vessel Port Olya-4   (IMO: 9481934, Flag: Russia) in the Caspian Sea near the port of Olya, Astrakhan region. The vessel was allegedly carrying munitions and drone components—specifically linked to Iran’s Shahed drone program—en route from Iran. If confirmed, this marks the first known successful Ukrainian strike on a maritime military shipment in the Caspian , and exposes a critical vulnerability in the Iran-Russia military supply chain. Geographic Overview Probable strike trajectory Port Olya Update: Salvage ops underway at 45.5817, 47.7303 on Reka Bakhtemir, south of Astrakhan. Satellite imagery confirms recovery of Port Olya-4, sunk while transporting Iranian Shahed UAV components. Multiple support vessels on site; another large vessel staged 460m south. Timeline and Vessel Movement August 1, 2025 : Port Olya-4  tracked off the Iranian coast via MarineTraffic data August 12, 2025 : En route to Astrakhan, Russia August 14, 2025 : Reported strike near Port Olya; vessel partially sank Despite official Russian statements claiming the vessel was hit by “drone fragments” and that all UAVs were “successfully intercepted,” satellite imagery and regional HUMINT suggest significant damage to the vessel’s superstructure  and partial submersion near the dock. Vessel Profile: Port Olya-4 Name:   Port Olya-4 Owner:  MG-Flot LLC (formerly Transmorfot LLC) Status:  Sanctioned by the U.S. in September 2024 Cargo Role:  Confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence to transport munitions and Shahed UAV components under covert manifest operations The Pashayev Network and Alabuga Connection MG-Flot LLC is owned by Jamaldin Pashayev , a sanctioned Russian businessman deeply embedded in the maritime weapons export network. His operations are centered around the commercial port of Olya, a key node in the North-South Transport Corridor —a logistics initiative heavily used for covert transfers between Iran and Russia. Ukrainian Defense Intelligence identifies Pashayev’s network as a critical intermediary  in supplying components to Alabuga JSC , the state-linked entity responsible for domestic Shahed drone assembly in Russia. Under the codename "Irlandia" , Iranian-supplied materials are disguised in customs documentation and routed through both maritime and rail channels. Sanctions Evasion via Caspian Maritime Assets The Port Olya-4  incident brings renewed focus on the 26-vessel fleet  operated by MG-Flot LLC. Among these, several vessels are suspected of transporting sensitive or dual-use cargoes, including: Anastasiia , Askar-Sarydzha , Gasret Aliev  (also used for grain theft operations) Genrikh Gasanov , Lady R , Lady Mariia, Maia-1 , Rasul Gamzatov , Port Olya-1/2/3 Valentin Emirov , Boris Kustodiev , Kompozitor Rakhmaninov All are reportedly still active and operating within sanctioned zones or routes with minimal oversight. ( https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/transport/ships/325 ) North-South Corridor: Multi-Vector Supply Chain To facilitate transfers from Iran to the Alabuga facility, Russia exploits all three branches of the North-South Transport Corridor : Trans-Caspian Route   (Primary focus of this strike) Maritime leg via the Caspian Sea Ports used: Russia : Astrakhan, Olya, Makhachkala Iran : Enzeli, Nowshahr, Amirabad Kazakhstan : Aktau, Kuryk Turkmenistan : Turkmenbashi Azerbaijan : Alat Western Route Overland transit through Azerbaijan and Georgia Eastern Route Via Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan railways Cargo is often transported in 20- or 40-foot standardized containers , each containing four to eight internal crates , later shifted to rail or truck transport under civilian manifests. Strategic Implications The destruction or disabling of Port Olya-4  signals a major intelligence and operational breakthrough  for Ukrainian forces, potentially disrupting one of Russia’s most discreet supply corridors. Furthermore, this raises questions about: The resilience of the Caspian route  for Russian military logistics Iran’s vulnerability as a sanctions partner and weapons supplier Conclusion The Port Olya-4  incident is a watershed moment in the covert maritime war surrounding Russia’s external supply chains. While confirmation is ongoing, the implications are already echoing across Moscow and Tehran’s defense sectors. The Caspian is no longer a sanctuary. 🔎 Russia Maritime Watch continues to monitor fleet movements, satellite imagery, and vessel manifests connected to MG-Flot LLC and the North-South Corridor. A full vessel watchlist and updated OSINT maps will be published in our next report. 📌 Follow @RussiaMaritimeWatch  for updates and in-depth analysis.

The waters of the Eastern Mediterranean have long been a stage for military maneuvers, and a recent maritime intelligence analysis has focused on an unusual but significant duo: the Tug 119  and the Russian diesel-electric Kilo II-class submarine, the Novorossisk . Although the submarine's precise location is unknown, it is presumed to be operating within the support radius of the Tug 119, which acts as a "silent shadow," providing essential logistical support. Following the loss of full access to the Tartus naval base in Syria, Russian naval forces have been compelled to seek new support options. In this context, Egypt has taken on a crucial role, offering its ports as a staging point. It's within this scenario that the recent activities of the Tug 119 are particularly noteworthy. A Highly Probable Port Call in Alexandria It's highly probable, though not officially confirmed, that the Tug 119 made a port visit to Alexandria. The certainty lies in the fact that the vessel ceased transmitting its position data during a specific timeframe. This radio silence is a telltale sign of a probable port call, with Alexandria  being the most logical location, given the tug's previously and subsequently recorded positions. This operational pattern suggests a strategic necessity for resupply and maintenance, an important window for the Novorossisk and its support vessel. Tug 119 Activity Log from July 15 Continuous monitoring of the Tug 119's activities has allowed us to outline a possible timeline of events and operations: July 15 - 20:  The Tug 119 arrives in the Alexandria area, likely to prepare for the submarine's arrival and establish a secure operational zone. During this period, the vessel may have conducted reconnaissance or waited for the submarine in a designated area. July 22 - 27:  As indicated by the cessation of its public tracking, the Tug 119 was likely moored in the port of Alexandria, coinciding with the Novorossisk's stop. This stay enabled critical operations such as refueling, resupply, and potential technical checks or repairs. July 28 - August 7:  After leaving the Egyptian port, the Tug 119 moved to an unspecified operational area in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its current position is not public, but it's believed to be continuing its role as a logistical shield for the Novorossisk, providing long-range support and ensuring the continuity of its missions in a strategic area. In conclusion, the ongoing patrols of the Tug 119 are not just routine navigation but a clear indication of Russian submarine presence and activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its consistent presence is the visible signal of a naval strategy that leverages flexibility and logistical support to maintain a projection of force, even without a permanent naval base in the region. The future activities of this support vessel will be crucial for anticipating the next moves of the Novorossisk and, more broadly, the Russian fleet in an area of global strategic importance.