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In recent months, the operational patterns of the MV Lauga (IMO 9111060) have attracted increased scrutiny from intelligence and maritime security analysts, particularly regarding its activity in the Ionian Sea and recurrent port calls along the West African coast. In September, the vessel conducted a transit through the Ionian Sea marked by an uncharacteristic course deviation and significant reduction in speed—maneuvers indicative of deliberate operational intent rather than routine navigation. Such behavior may be linked to covert logistics operations, potentially involving the illicit transport of arms or contraband cargo to strategically significant African ports. A recent investigative report by Meduza highlighted suspicious activity associated with the MV Lauga, including possible deployments of surveillance drones , further amplifying concerns over the vessel’s operational profile. Within this framework, the vessel’s trajectory through the Ionian Sea could correspond to an ISR ( Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance ) mission, possibly involving underwater drone operations, given the critical submarine cable infrastructure traversing the area, including cables originating from Israel. While there is no definitive evidence directly connecting the MV Lauga to Russian governmental agencies or the Ministry of Defense, its operational patterns and West African port calls strongly suggest a potential role in supporting military or paramilitary activities within the region. Considering the strategic importance of the visited ports and the historical context of Russian military engagement in West Africa, the MV Lauga’s movements warrant sustained monitoring and detailed intelligence analysis to assess its probable involvement in regional military logistics networks and suspected ISR drone operations. Routes operated by the LAUGA vessel from 2023 to 2025 (Global fishing watch): Report by Meduza: An invisible maritime menace The Russian vessel Lauga  is suspected of conducting covert ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) operations in the North Sea, deploying unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to surveil critical German military infrastructure. On 17 May 2025, a German patrol craft detected multiple UAS swarming around Lauga  near Borkum Island, indicating active drone deployment capabilities. Although a subsequent inspection in Belgium yielded no concrete evidence, intelligence assessments have linked Lauga  to Russian naval logistics hubs in Tartus, Syria, and to Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation. The vessel's frequent port calls in Iran and Turkmenistan further suggest non-commercial routes aligned with potential strategic intelligence missions. These patterns underscore concerns about the exploitation of ostensibly civilian maritime assets for clandestine military ISR activities that evade conventional detection. Last two months (August - September 2025) Russian activity in West Africa reveals a notable increase in maritime traffic. The LAUGA - 9111060, recently observed Cotonou and Bissau, likely serves as a logistical asset supporting Moscow's military. Last month (September 2025) Submarine Cable Map

Published: September 7, 2025 In yet another display of the Russian Federation’s reliance on aging commercial vessels for military logistics, the Ro-Ro cargo ship ADLER (IMO 9179854) —a 27-year-old vessel flying the Russian flag —has resumed its westbound route after mechanical failures halted its mission in the Western Mediterranean. Ro-Ro cargo ship ADLER The Vessel: Aging Backbone of Shadow Supply Chains Built in 1998 , ADLER is operated by the sanctioned Russian maritime logistics company LLC “M Leasing” (TIN: 9701173086). Despite its age and poor mechanical reliability, it remains a functional element in Russia’s ongoing strategy of using dual-use civilian vessels for covert military transport missions —an operational necessity given the constraints imposed by international sanctions and maritime tracking. Cargo and Sourcing Activity The vessel departed St. Petersburg on August 11, 2025 , after a 17-day layover at the Morskoy Fasad terminal , a known embarkation point for sensitive and military-related cargo. Morskoy Fasad terminal According to AIS-based draught readings, ADLER went from a draught of 5.2 m to 5.9 m **, indicating a loading of ~1,000–1,300 tonnes of cargo. This corresponds to an estimated: 35–60 TEUs (20-ft containers) or 36–50 FEUs (40-ft containers) Alternatively, a mix of cargoes could also be loaded: 15 containers and 75 military vehicles , including likely variants such as BTR-82A APCs or MT-LB armored transports . Such logistics patterns are consistent with previous Ro-Ro deployments moving military material through the Black Sea-Baltic-Mediterranean route under commercial cover. Mechanical Failures and Tow Events On August 25 at 01:00 UTC , ADLER reported loss of navigational control , indicating possible engine or steering gear failure —not uncommon for older vessels in constant use without dry-dock rotation. Subsequently, the vessel remained adrift 20 nautical miles west of Porto, Portugal , until August 29 , when it was taken under tow by the Spanish-flagged tug ROMA . ( @claudialanz on BlueSky ) After reaching a holding position north of Al Hoceima, Morocco (an area recently used by other Russian replenishment units), the vessel anchored on September 4 and began its final leg toward Oran, Algeria on September 9 — still under tow. Satellite images during the tow north of Al Hoceima September 4 th, Ro Ro ADLER - Tug ROMA Last position as of September 7th , Ro Ro ADLER - Tug ROMA Strategic Observations * No Russian Navy escort was observed during the journey. * The port of Oran (Algeria) is widely believed to be the final destination, although this was not confirmed prior to the failure event. * The use of unescorted, mechanically degraded vessels to transport military cargo through contested waters reflects both Russia’s stretched naval logistics and the chronic underinvestment in auxiliary fleet maintenance . Conclusion: Maritime Weak Points The ADLER case illustrates a critical vulnerability in the Russian maritime supply chain: a dependence on aging commercial hulls , insufficiently maintained and operating at the edge of reliability , yet tasked with critical supply roles. Open-source maritime intelligence monitoring  of these slow-moving vessels continues to reveal key patterns: predictable routing , frequent mechanical vulnerabilities , and the absence of military escort  all underscore the structural weaknesses of Russia’s logistics operations in the Mediterranean. These observations, derived from AIS data and publicly available sources, highlight the operational strain on a fleet increasingly reliant on aging commercial assets for strategic transport missions. 📎 *Tracked via open AIS data and corroborated by independent maritime observers.* 📡 Source: [ @claudialanz on BlueSky ](https://bsky.app/profile/claudialanz.bsky.social/post/3lxuurcgtfs2x)

Date: August 19, 2025 On August 7, 2025, the Udaloy-class  destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov  exited the Baltic Sea via the Great Belt Strait, beginning a coordinated escort mission. Udaloy-class  destroyer Vice Admiral Kulakov  exited the Baltic Sea Three days later, on August 10 at 12:50 UTC, the ship was visually confirmed in the Dover Strait after a 695-nautical-mile transit at 10 knots. August 10 at 12:50 UTC - Vice Admiral Kulakov - Dover Strait At the same time, two Russian-flagged support vessels — the RO-RO cargo ship Sparta  and the tanker Skobelev  — were tracked northeast-bound off Brest, maintaining similar speed. Their converging positions and timing strongly suggest a pre-planned rendezvous and formation of a naval convoy , roughly 50 NM north of the French coastline. Escorted Transit: Strategic Assurance After the link-up, Kulakov  assumed escort duties for the two support vessels through one of the busiest maritime chokepoints in the world. This configuration — destroyer + RO-RO + tanker — hadn’t been observed in the Channel for months, signaling renewed Russian interest in secure, protected sea-based logistics . On August 12 in the morning hours, the group maneuvered off the UK coastline, pausing roughly 18 NM offshore for around five hours. This tactical deviation likely served as a controlled pause for technical trials, refueling, or systems calibration , and simultaneously kept the formation outside high-traffic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)  and NATO surveillance corridors. On August 12 - Russian naval group's staging point Visual Clues: Cargo Profile Changes Tanker Skobelev - July 1, passage outbound from the Baltic Tanker Skobelev - August 12, passage inbound the Baltic Imagery from public maritime observers and satellite platforms reveals notable differences between outbound and return transits. On August 12, Skobelev  appeared significantly lighter under the Great Belt  compared to her July 1 passage outbound from the Baltic — indicating probable fuel or liquid cargo delivery. Sparta , meanwhile, showed changes in deck configuration: missing were the white ISO containers  seen on July 1, replaced by a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) , jet-powered and typically used for coastal patrols. RHIBs of this class are known to operate from the Russian naval facility in Tartus, Syria , where Sparta  had previously docked — suggesting reverse transport or post-mission recovery. Ro Ro Sparta - August 12, passage inbound the Baltic Escort + Tanker = Logistics Force Multiplier This operation highlights a refined Russian maritime logistics model: civilian support vessels operating under direct naval escort , with embedded refueling capability. While Russia possesses specialized replenishment ships, using a civilian tanker like Skobelev  offers strategic ambiguity , lower visibility, and diplomatic cover. At the same time, the presence of Kulakov  ensures layered protection — a clear message that Russia won’t risk strategic cargo movement , even in peacetime transit through Western waters. Conclusion This Channel transit under escort reflects a deliberate evolution in Russian naval logistics : the blending of commercial and military assets into protected, multi-role convoys . As Moscow recalibrates its approach to long-range resupply and force projection, expect further use of this model in contested maritime zones, where visibility is high, and risk is increasing.

Date:  August 15, 2025 Category:  Maritime Intelligence | Military Logistics | Sanctions Evasion Summary On August 14, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces reportedly struck the Russian cargo vessel Port Olya-4   (IMO: 9481934, Flag: Russia) in the Caspian Sea near the port of Olya, Astrakhan region. The vessel was allegedly carrying munitions and drone components—specifically linked to Iran’s Shahed drone program—en route from Iran. If confirmed, this marks the first known successful Ukrainian strike on a maritime military shipment in the Caspian , and exposes a critical vulnerability in the Iran-Russia military supply chain. Geographic Overview Probable strike trajectory Port Olya Update: Salvage ops underway at 45.5817, 47.7303 on Reka Bakhtemir, south of Astrakhan. Satellite imagery confirms recovery of Port Olya-4, sunk while transporting Iranian Shahed UAV components. Multiple support vessels on site; another large vessel staged 460m south. Timeline and Vessel Movement August 1, 2025 : Port Olya-4  tracked off the Iranian coast via MarineTraffic data August 12, 2025 : En route to Astrakhan, Russia August 14, 2025 : Reported strike near Port Olya; vessel partially sank Despite official Russian statements claiming the vessel was hit by “drone fragments” and that all UAVs were “successfully intercepted,” satellite imagery and regional HUMINT suggest significant damage to the vessel’s superstructure  and partial submersion near the dock. Vessel Profile: Port Olya-4 Name:   Port Olya-4 Owner:  MG-Flot LLC (formerly Transmorfot LLC) Status:  Sanctioned by the U.S. in September 2024 Cargo Role:  Confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence to transport munitions and Shahed UAV components under covert manifest operations The Pashayev Network and Alabuga Connection MG-Flot LLC is owned by Jamaldin Pashayev , a sanctioned Russian businessman deeply embedded in the maritime weapons export network. His operations are centered around the commercial port of Olya, a key node in the North-South Transport Corridor —a logistics initiative heavily used for covert transfers between Iran and Russia. Ukrainian Defense Intelligence identifies Pashayev’s network as a critical intermediary  in supplying components to Alabuga JSC , the state-linked entity responsible for domestic Shahed drone assembly in Russia. Under the codename "Irlandia" , Iranian-supplied materials are disguised in customs documentation and routed through both maritime and rail channels. Sanctions Evasion via Caspian Maritime Assets The Port Olya-4  incident brings renewed focus on the 26-vessel fleet  operated by MG-Flot LLC. Among these, several vessels are suspected of transporting sensitive or dual-use cargoes, including: Anastasiia , Askar-Sarydzha , Gasret Aliev  (also used for grain theft operations) Genrikh Gasanov , Lady R , Lady Mariia, Maia-1 , Rasul Gamzatov , Port Olya-1/2/3 Valentin Emirov , Boris Kustodiev , Kompozitor Rakhmaninov All are reportedly still active and operating within sanctioned zones or routes with minimal oversight. ( https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/transport/ships/325 ) North-South Corridor: Multi-Vector Supply Chain To facilitate transfers from Iran to the Alabuga facility, Russia exploits all three branches of the North-South Transport Corridor : Trans-Caspian Route   (Primary focus of this strike) Maritime leg via the Caspian Sea Ports used: Russia : Astrakhan, Olya, Makhachkala Iran : Enzeli, Nowshahr, Amirabad Kazakhstan : Aktau, Kuryk Turkmenistan : Turkmenbashi Azerbaijan : Alat Western Route Overland transit through Azerbaijan and Georgia Eastern Route Via Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan railways Cargo is often transported in 20- or 40-foot standardized containers , each containing four to eight internal crates , later shifted to rail or truck transport under civilian manifests. Strategic Implications The destruction or disabling of Port Olya-4  signals a major intelligence and operational breakthrough  for Ukrainian forces, potentially disrupting one of Russia’s most discreet supply corridors. Furthermore, this raises questions about: The resilience of the Caspian route  for Russian military logistics Iran’s vulnerability as a sanctions partner and weapons supplier Conclusion The Port Olya-4  incident is a watershed moment in the covert maritime war surrounding Russia’s external supply chains. While confirmation is ongoing, the implications are already echoing across Moscow and Tehran’s defense sectors. The Caspian is no longer a sanctuary. 🔎 Russia Maritime Watch continues to monitor fleet movements, satellite imagery, and vessel manifests connected to MG-Flot LLC and the North-South Corridor. A full vessel watchlist and updated OSINT maps will be published in our next report. 📌 Follow @RussiaMaritimeWatch  for updates and in-depth analysis.

The waters of the Eastern Mediterranean have long been a stage for military maneuvers, and a recent maritime intelligence analysis has focused on an unusual but significant duo: the Tug 119  and the Russian diesel-electric Kilo II-class submarine, the Novorossisk . Although the submarine's precise location is unknown, it is presumed to be operating within the support radius of the Tug 119, which acts as a "silent shadow," providing essential logistical support. Following the loss of full access to the Tartus naval base in Syria, Russian naval forces have been compelled to seek new support options. In this context, Egypt has taken on a crucial role, offering its ports as a staging point. It's within this scenario that the recent activities of the Tug 119 are particularly noteworthy. A Highly Probable Port Call in Alexandria It's highly probable, though not officially confirmed, that the Tug 119 made a port visit to Alexandria. The certainty lies in the fact that the vessel ceased transmitting its position data during a specific timeframe. This radio silence is a telltale sign of a probable port call, with Alexandria  being the most logical location, given the tug's previously and subsequently recorded positions. This operational pattern suggests a strategic necessity for resupply and maintenance, an important window for the Novorossisk and its support vessel. Tug 119 Activity Log from July 15 Continuous monitoring of the Tug 119's activities has allowed us to outline a possible timeline of events and operations: July 15 - 20:  The Tug 119 arrives in the Alexandria area, likely to prepare for the submarine's arrival and establish a secure operational zone. During this period, the vessel may have conducted reconnaissance or waited for the submarine in a designated area. July 22 - 27:  As indicated by the cessation of its public tracking, the Tug 119 was likely moored in the port of Alexandria, coinciding with the Novorossisk's stop. This stay enabled critical operations such as refueling, resupply, and potential technical checks or repairs. July 28 - August 7:  After leaving the Egyptian port, the Tug 119 moved to an unspecified operational area in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its current position is not public, but it's believed to be continuing its role as a logistical shield for the Novorossisk, providing long-range support and ensuring the continuity of its missions in a strategic area. In conclusion, the ongoing patrols of the Tug 119 are not just routine navigation but a clear indication of Russian submarine presence and activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its consistent presence is the visible signal of a naval strategy that leverages flexibility and logistical support to maintain a projection of force, even without a permanent naval base in the region. The future activities of this support vessel will be crucial for anticipating the next moves of the Novorossisk and, more broadly, the Russian fleet in an area of global strategic importance.

A Russian military convoy is currently underway in the Mediterranean exit zone, west of Tenes, Algeria, involving: 🔹 SPARTA  (Russian-flagged merchant vessel) 🔹 GENERAL SKOBELEV  (Russian-flagged tanker/oil vessel) 🔹 DADNA BASE / BOIKY 532  (Steregushchiy-class corvette, Russian Navy) According to AIS tracking data, the Steregushchiy-class corvette Boiky  (hull number 532)  is actively escorting the merchant vessel SPARTA  and the tanker GENERAL SKOBELEV  as the group transits westward at a speed of ~11 knots on heading 260°. The last port call for SPARTA includes a confirmed stop in Tartus, Syria , where it conducted loading/unloading operations—presumably related to military equipment or logistics. The presence of a surface combatant escort  for civilian vessels is a clear indicator of sensitive or high-value cargo , potentially including military hardware or dual-use equipment , underscoring the strategic importance of this convoy to the Russian Federation. 🛰️ The escort operation highlights the ongoing Russian military logistics activity in the Mediterranean , with Tartus remaining a critical naval logistics hub. The direct involvement of Boiky 532  points to the convoy’s elevated operational security requirements. 📍 Current Position: North of Tenes, Algeria ⛴️ Last departure: Gulei, China (SPARTA - Aug 3, 19:40 UTC) 🛑 Destination: Unreported / Not available via AIS ⚠️ During a previous return from the Mediterranean, a shadow fleet vessel  joined the convoy mid-transit. Merchant traffic in the area should be closely monitored — a similar insertion of an untracked or sanctioned vessel could occur again. #MaritimeSecurity #OSINT Assessment: This movement fits the profile of ongoing Russian efforts to maintain and protect military supply chains between domestic production centers and forward bases (i.e., Tartus). The active escort by a navy warship signals cargo of strategic relevance , possibly linked to Syria-based operations or restocking post-deployment assets.

The Russian-flagged general cargo vessel MV Lauga  (IMO 9111060), constructed in 1994, has recently conducted port calls in West African locations such as Conakry (Guinea), Bissau (Guinea-Bissau), and Cotonou (Benin). These ports have been associated with activities involving Russian private military companies (PMCs) and the transport of military equipment. While there is no direct evidence linking MV Lauga to Russian governmental or Ministry of Defence entities, the vessel's operational patterns suggest potential strategic military implications. Vessel Profile and Operational History Name:  MV Lauga IMO Number:  9111060 Flag:  Russian Federation Type:  General Cargo Ship Deadweight Tonnage:  3,186 tonnes Length Overall:  102.3 meters Beam:  16.4 meters Year Built:  1994 Notably, MV Lauga's operational routes have intersected with regions of strategic interest to Russian military operations and PMCs. Strategic Analysis of Port Calls Conakry (Guinea) Conakry has been a focal point for Russian PMCs operating in West Africa. The port's infrastructure and geopolitical positioning make it a strategic location for logistical support to military operations in the region. MV Lauga's call at Conakry on July 5, 2025, places it in proximity to these activities, raising questions about potential logistical support functions. Wikipedia Bissau (Guinea-Bissau) Bissau serves as a transit point for various maritime activities, some of which have been linked to the transport of military equipment. While there is no direct evidence of MV Lauga's involvement in such activities, its presence in the region warrants scrutiny, given the historical context of arms trafficking through West African ports. Cotonou (Benin) Cotonou is a significant port in West Africa, with a history of being used for the transshipment of goods, including military supplies. MV Lauga's operations in this area suggest a potential role in regional logistics networks, which may include support for military or paramilitary operations. Operational Patterns and Potential Military Implications MV Lauga's operational patterns exhibit characteristics often associated with military logistics support: Extended Port Stays:  Prolonged stays in ports such as Conakry and Bissau may indicate the loading or unloading of sensitive cargo, possibly related to military logistics. Routing Through Strategic Locations:  The vessel's routing through areas with known military activity suggests potential coordination with military or paramilitary entities. AIS Data Anomalies:  Instances of AIS data manipulation or gaps in reporting can be indicative of operations involving sensitive or covert activities. While these patterns do not constitute direct evidence of MV Lauga's involvement in military operations, they align with behaviors observed in vessels engaged in military logistics. Last Position Conclusion While there is no conclusive evidence linking MV Lauga directly to Russian governmental or Ministry of Defence entities, its operational patterns and port calls in West Africa suggest a potential role in supporting military or paramilitary activities in the region. Given the strategic importance of the ports visited and the historical context of Russian military involvement in West Africa, MV Lauga's operations warrant further monitoring and analysis to assess its potential contributions to regional military logistics networks.

Sketchy Boats - schedule ( 6/11 ) Tankers that are 15 years or older Age: 22 years United Kingdom sanctioned vessels: Ships involved in the transportation of Russian oil (sanctions: uk-2025-07-21) European Union sanctioned vessels: Seventeenth sanctions package (sanctions: eu-2025-05-21) Flags that this ship carried, that were determined to be false Aruba (fraud:false-flag) Vessel listed on the false Aruba Maritime Administration & Offshore Company Registry website Currently false flagged Current Position Current Status: The current position of WHITE CONDOR I is at North East Atlantic Ocean reported 1 min ago by AIS. The vessel is en route to SKAGEN OPL , sailing at a speed of 13.6 knots and expected to arrive there on Aug 7, 15:00 . The vessel WHITE CONDOR I (IMO 9255244, MMSI 307026000) is a Oil Products Tanker built in 2003 (22 years old) and currently sailing under the flag of Aruba . Comments: After spending two months loitering in the Mediterranean, false flagged WHITE CONDOR I (previously BOLOGNIA FALCON), sets sail for 'SKAGEN'. Sketchy Boats - Link: https://sketchy.boats/9255244 Ports Visited

Premise: Monitoring and Tracking Systems In the current operational environment, monitoring the Russian shadow fleet is a strategic priority for international maritime security. There's an intensifying reliance on specialized databases such as " sketchy.boats ,"  a dedicated platform that allows for the verification and inclusion of potentially suspicious vessels identified as part of the shadow fleet. This tool is a critical asset for naval intelligence , enabling the crowdsourcing of information and collaborative monitoring of suspect naval units. The importance of such databases cannot be overstated in the current geopolitical landscape. The ability to rapidly track and identify shadow fleet vessels through these systems significantly multiplies the force  for maritime intelligence operations. Our dedicated website will maintain an updated list and map  of monitored units, providing continuous support for naval intelligence analyses, drawing in expert intelligence analysts. Key Departure Ports and Primary Destinations Departure Hubs The primary departure hubs for shadow tankers are located in the Baltic (Ust-Luga and Primorsk terminals) and the Black Sea (Tuapse and Novorossiysk terminals). In the first half of 2024, these terminals accounted for 42% of Russian seaborne hydrocarbon exports. These vessels frequently operate under the flags of convenience from countries like Gabon , Liberia , and the Cook Islands , and regularly call at Russian oil ports including Primorsk , Ust-Luga , Vyssotsk , and St. Petersburg . Routes and Destinations Shadow fleet units primarily utilize three strategic corridors: Baltic Route:  From the Baltic to Asian destinations, transiting through the North Sea and circumnavigating the northern UK to bypass traditional chokepoints like the English Channel. Black Sea Route:  From Tuapse and Novorossiysk terminals towards the Mediterranean, with primary destinations in the Middle East and Asia. Arctic Route:  Utilizing ports such as Murmansk, operational for 7-8 months a year, en route to Asian destinations via the Northern Sea Route. Operational tactics employed include spoofed geolocation data , false routing, switched-off communications, and ship-to-ship transfers in international waters. New FSB Security Directives Vessels originating from foreign ports are now permitted to enter Russian ports only with the explicit authorization of the respective seaport captain, which must be coordinated with a Federal Security Service (FSB) official. This decree was signed by Vladimir Putin in response to new EU sanctions, mandating FSB approval for foreign vessel access to Russian ports. This directive, issued on July 21, 2025, is a precautionary measure aimed at preventing potential damage to Russian port infrastructure and shadow fleet units during loading operations. The imposition of mandatory FSB pre-authorization underscores Russia's escalating concern for the security of its illicit commercial naval operations.( @SONARROW_OSINT ) Recent Incidents and Attacks on Shadow Fleet Units Infrastructure Sabotage The most significant escalation in recent months involves the direct participation of the shadow fleet in sabotage operations against critical Western infrastructure. The tanker Eagle S , suspected of being part of Russia's "ghost fleet," is implicated in damaging the EstLink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia on December 25, 2024, reportedly using its anchor. Kinetic Attacks against Units Since January 2025, there has been an intensification of attacks against shadow fleet tankers. Six tankers have been struck by explosions of unknown origin, all occurring after the vessels had made calls at Russian ports. The latest incident involves the Eco Wizard , which experienced two detonations ten minutes apart on July 6 while berthed. This pattern of attacks suggests the existence of coordinated maritime counter-intelligence operations , designed to degrade the shadow fleet's operational capability through direct action. Protection and Escort of Units: The Estonia Case Russia has demonstrated a willingness to actively protect its shadow fleet units through direct intervention. The recent incident involving the tanker Green Admire , detained by Russian authorities while transiting a route previously agreed upon with Estonia and Finland, highlights the crucial and controversial role of Moscow's "shadow fleet." This episode underscores how Moscow is escalating its protective posture towards shadow fleet units, directly challenging international agreements to ensure the protection of its illicit commercial operations. For the first time, a Russian warship, the corvette Boyky , directly escorted two tankers of the "shadow fleet" through the English Channel, providing direct protection to these commercial units. A map of the Green Admire's  route in the Gulf of Finland on May 17 and 18. The tanker is currently anchored off Suursaar Island , also known as Gogland. Venemaa is the Estonian name for Russia. Source: Risto Paenurm/ERR Evasion Tactics and Alternative Routes Diversification of Arctic Routes To counter intensified controls on traditional routes, Russia has shifted some of its shadow fleet activities towards Arctic ports such as Murmansk. However, these represent a fallback solution, as they are only navigable for seven to eight months of the year. Northern UK Routes Shadow fleet units have developed navigation patterns aimed at evading controls by circumnavigating the northern UK, exploiting international waters to minimize exposure to Western maritime authority inspections. This tactic enables them to avoid traditional chokepoints like the English Channel, where joint NATO patrols increase the likelihood of interdiction and inspection. Institutional Response and Countermeasures NATO and the EU have initiated a monitoring mission following suspicious incidents attributed to the Russian "ghost fleet" and have introduced new sanctions. The intensification of countermeasures indicates recognition of the shadow fleet as a systemic threat to maritime security and Western economic stability. Intelligence Assessment The Russian shadow fleet currently serves as a multi-purpose instrument  for Moscow: economically, it circumvents oil sanctions; operationally, it provides sabotage capabilities  against critical infrastructure; strategically, it constitutes a power projection asset  in the maritime domain. The tactical evolution towards utilizing Arctic and northern routes, combined with active protection of units by Russian authorities, indicates a maturation of the operational concept . The series of kinetic attacks against tankers suggests the existence of coordinated counter-operations, likely conducted through proxies or Western special units. Continuous monitoring via specialized databases like sketchy.boats and collaborative intelligence remain the most effective tools for tracking and neutralizing this asymmetric threat  in the maritime domain.

As Russia adapts to its declining presence in Syria, the logistical footprint of its maritime operations is evolving — and the case of the LADY D  exemplifies this transformation. Currently stationary just north of Port Said, the sanctioned Russian-flagged merchant vessel, which departed the Baltic in late May 2025, presents a key indicator of how Moscow is reconfiguring its military and strategic supply chains across the broader Indo-Pacific axis. Strategic Maritime Reach: Russia’s Indo-Pacific Logistics and Bilateral Access Points As Russia recalibrates its maritime logistics following the diminishing viability of Tartus as a strategic hub, it is increasingly reliant on bilateral partnerships across the Indo-Pacific and South Asia to project operational endurance and maintain military-industrial outreach. These destinations serve both overt commercial and latent military functions, particularly in the context of circumventing Western sanctions and sustaining long-range deployments of sanctioned or dual-use cargo vessels. Activity registered August 2023 - India area 🇮🇳 India Strategic Profile:  Longstanding defense partner Key Ports:   Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Chennai Objectives: Technical support for Russian-supplied platforms (S-400, Talwar-class frigates, Ka-series helicopters) Informal logistical access for Russian naval and merchant shipping Ongoing cooperation in nuclear energy and defense industrial transfers Naval interoperability via INDRA NAVY joint exercises 🇻🇳 Vietnam Strategic Profile:  Cold War-era ally with Russian-equipped naval forces Key Ports:   Cam Ranh Bay (historically used by Soviet Navy), Hai Phong Objectives: Depot-level maintenance for Russian-origin vessels and submarines Resupply and technical exchanges under existing security agreements Potential fallback maritime access node in the South China Sea 🇲🇲 Myanmar Strategic Profile:  Defense and counter-Western alignment Key Ports:   Yangon, Kyaukpyu Objectives: Delivery of Yak-130 aircraft, air defense systems, and ISR platforms Military advisor presence and bilateral arms logistics Unofficial maritime access under opaque port arrangements 🇮🇩 Indonesia Strategic Profile:  Non-aligned defense consumer with procurement interests Key Ports:   Surabaya, Tanjung Priok Objectives: Suspended arms procurement (e.g., Su-35) due to CAATSA constraints Civilian port access for dual-use logistics under commercial pretext Ongoing strategic dialogue within ASEAN-Russia framework 🇮🇷 Iran Strategic Profile:  High-level military-technological alliance Key Ports:   Bandar Abbas, Chabahar Objectives: Transfer hub for UAVs, precision munitions, and electronic warfare components Joint naval drills with China and Russia Critical node on Russia’s "Southern Corridor" to the Indian Ocean 🇨🇳 China Strategic Profile:  Top-tier strategic partner across economic and military dimensions Key Ports:   Shanghai, Qingdao, Guangzhou Objectives: Military-industrial cooperation and energy logistics Dual-use transit for sanctioned cargo Participation in coordinated maritime drills (e.g., Sea Interaction) Strategic Implications: With the erosion of Syria’s utility as a maritime logistics hub, Russia is now forced to extend the operational range of its merchant and auxiliary fleets. This shift necessitates enhanced blue-water logistics autonomy , including ship-to-ship refueling, offshore staging, and reliance on partner-state port access —some overt, some unofficial. These Indo-Pacific nodes represent the Kremlin’s evolving logistics doctrine, emphasizing resilience, dispersion , and global engagement through flexible bilateral corridors . LADY D Off Port Said: Russia’s Post-Syria Shift Initially assessed to be en route to Tartus — Russia’s long-standing naval logistics hub in Syria — the LADY D  now appears to have bypassed the Levant entirely. Instead, OSINT and AIS data suggest a probable onward passage through the Suez Canal, with likely destinations being India, China, or Southeast Asian nations. This represents a significant shift in vector for Russian military maritime logistics, which traditionally operated on shorter loops within the Mediterranean theater under the protective umbrella of the Syrian corridor. Notably, LADY D  is currently anchored among several tankers in a known offshore transfer zone, north of the Suez approach. This pattern is consistent with previous Russian-flagged logistics vessels such as MV Ascalon  and MV Maia-1 , which engaged in ship-to-ship (STS)  operations to extend range and operational endurance — a standard yet strategically meaningful procedure. These STS refueling or resupply maneuvers enable Russian ships to sustain longer transits without port calls, minimizing exposure to international monitoring and port state controls. The move away from Tartus is not a routine deviation. With the weakening of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Moscow’s progressive military drawdown in Syria, Russia can no longer rely on the Levant as a logistics node for its military presence in the Mediterranean and broader MENA region. As a result, ships like LADY D  now face extended deployments, requiring robust sustainment capabilities and coordination across partner ports or neutral logistical corridors. What this means strategically is twofold: Russia is recalibrating its naval logistics to project power eastward , toward Asia-Pacific partners — a move that fits with broader diplomatic efforts aimed at deepening ties with India, China, and ASEAN-aligned states. The absence of a Mediterranean hub stretches Russia’s naval logistics , reducing operational efficiency and increasing dependence on extended blue-water supply lines and non-traditional support methods such as STS fueling and offshore coordination. While such long-haul transits might appear standard, the implications for regional security architecture are clear. Russia is adapting — not retreating — and the LADY D  is evidence of an increasingly globalized, adaptive maritime logistics strategy. As Western navies and analysts continue to monitor Russian fleet and merchant movements, understanding the logistical adaptations post-Syria is critical to anticipating Moscow’s next strategic plays.

The Russian-flagged merchant vessel Baltic Leader , previously sanctioned for its involvement in illicit arms transfers, is currently on a south-easterly course toward the Libyan coast. As of 11 June 2025 at 11:43 UTC, the vessel was located at coordinates 34.2828°N, 15.6258°E, maintaining a heading of 133° at a speed of 9.4 knots. Estimated time of arrival (ETA) at the port of Benghazi is 12 June 2025 at 14:55 UTC. The Baltic Leader  is operated by MG-Flot LLC and leased via PSB Leasing, an entity closely linked to Russia’s defense-industrial complex and sanctioned for its role in military logistics support. https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/transport/ships/99 https://x.com/scandura/status/1932750441013551273 The vessel recently conducted offload operations in Conakry, Guinea, where open-source intelligence (OSINT) indicates it delivered military materiel and dual-use equipment of Russian origin. https://x.com/RFNOSBlog This movement aligns with a notable event on 26 May 2025, when the Libyan National Army (LNA) conducted a high-visibility military parade south of Benghazi. Imagery analysis and field reporting from the parade identified the presence of Russian-manufactured armored vehicles and associated support equipment, suggesting recent inflows of Russian defense material into eastern Libya. https://x.com/AfriMEOSINT/status/1926951238467190828 The convergence of these timelines and maritime activities suggests a resumption—or escalation—of Russian military-logistics operations supporting proxy or partner forces in North Africa. This reflects a strategic recalibration of Russian force posture and influence projection following the drawdown of assets from Syria and the reorientation of operational reach within the Mediterranean basin. The arrival of the Baltic Leader  in Benghazi is tactically significant, potentially marking the reactivation of a maritime supply line similar in function to the former "Syrian Express"—but now adapted for the Libyan theatre. This emerging logistics corridor enhances Russia's capacity for strategic sustainment and forward presence in the central Mediterranean, reinforcing its alignment with LNA forces under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. For NATO and its partners, this activity merits close monitoring. It indicates a shift in Russian maritime military logistics toward North Africa, potentially impacting regional stability and challenging freedom of navigation and strategic balance in the southern flank. The use of sanctioned commercial vessels to deliver military cargo underlines the continued exploitation of hybrid logistical tactics by the Russian Federation to circumvent international restrictions and project power in contested regions.

Russia continues to refine and expand its maritime logistics strategy in West Africa, using sanctioned merchant vessels to conduct discreet military shipments to allied regimes. The latest delivery of Russian armored assets—broadcast on Malian state television and including Spartak APCs  and other tactical vehicles—appears to mark the third successful military transfer via sea since January 2025 , utilizing a logistical route through Guinea’s Port of Conakry . This trend underscores Russia’s growing commitment to sustaining partner forces in the Sahel, particularly the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), now operating in tandem with Moscow’s restructured paramilitary presence, the “Africa Corps” —a formal evolution of the former Wagner Group. POST: Malian junta holds parade in #Bamako with "new cutting-edge weapons" purchased in Russia.(Source: Ivoirowsky ) POST: This convoy is a little different in the vehicles sent to Mali. I can see some unusual vehicles, notably : - EW BTRs : Borissoglebsk-2 system - Vystrels - M - Artillery pieces : 122D30 / 152D20 Electronic Warfare vehicles in particular catch my attention, and might be sent directly to Africa Corps as part of sensitive vehicle. This convoy in general seems way more adapted to fighting terrorists, unlike the previous ones. (Source: casus belli ) POST: Russian vessels MV Patria and MV Baltic Leader spotted stationary off Conakry . Not just a port call — signs point to the delivery of weapons and military equipment.  Moscow is deepening its military footprint in West Africa. (Source: RFNOSBlog ) MV Baltic Leader MV Patria Updated Vessel Movement Analysis As of early June 2025, OSINT and AIS maritime tracking indicate a dynamic shift in the movement of the key vessels involved in this Russian logistical network: MV Baltic Leader : Having loitered off Conakry for several days—likely during offloading operations—it is now sailing northward , currently navigating along the West African coast. Its trajectory suggests a probable return to the Baltic Sea region , potentially for resupply or additional cargo loading. MV Patria : No longer approaching Conakry, the Patria  is currently east of the Strait of Gibraltar , actively transiting back toward the Baltic basin . This repositioning may indicate the completion of a delivery cycle or a tactical reassignment of shipping assets. MV Siyanie Severa : Currently stationed offshore near Lagos, Nigeria , in holding position. Its proximity to key Nigerian maritime infrastructure is noteworthy given recent upticks in Russian-Nigerian diplomatic contacts. The coordinated presence and now sequential withdrawal of these vessels strongly indicate a multi-vessel rotational maritime delivery system , likely orchestrated to sustain materiel flow while minimizing port exposure times and satellite detection windows. Military Cargo Assessment The recent cargo delivered to Mali includes: Spartak 4x4 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) : Modular wheeled platforms designed for convoy protection, light infantry mobility, and internal security operations in irregular warfare zones. MRAP-like armored vehicles  and logistical trucks , likely intended to reinforce counter-insurgency operations in central and northern Mali. Potential military-grade communications and EW support gear , based on historical precedent from similar deliveries. These assets are assessed to significantly enhance the Africa Corps’ operational flexibility and the FAMa’s capacity to project power beyond core urban areas. Strategic and Geopolitical Implications Russia's ability to deliver advanced military equipment using sanctioned commercial shipping  demonstrates growing confidence in its maritime logistics strategy. By leveraging under-regulated ports such as Conakry and exploiting maritime legal gray zones , Moscow continues to support partner states with high strategic value: Mali : Host of Africa Corps deployments, operational hub for counter-insurgency efforts, and a key node in Russia’s Sahel strategy. Guinea : Emerging as a logistical enabler due to its port accessibility, political alignment, and limited Western naval oversight. Nigeria (Lagos area) : Potential new maritime waypoint for Russian vessels, warranting close monitoring by Western maritime surveillance assets. The realignment of ship positions back toward the Baltic hints at a closed-loop supply model , wherein vessels rotate between Russian ports and West African offload points, avoiding prolonged exposure and adapting routes to evade detection. Conclusion Russia’s maritime military logistics chain—anchored by sanctioned cargo vessels like Baltic Leader , Siyanie Severa , and Patria —is now a proven delivery method for deploying arms, vehicles, and potentially personnel across Africa’s west coast. For defense analysts, this represents a critical development in Russia’s hybrid expeditionary strategy , blending state logistics with sanctioned commercial assets to maintain strategic depth and extend influence in Africa’s contested security environment.